Biased but in doubt: Conflict and decision confidence

PLoS ONE

Volumn 6, Issue 1, 2011, Pages

  de Neys, Wim ^a   Cromheeke, Sofie ^b   Osman, Magda ^c  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

^c QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADOLESCENT; ARTICLE; ASSOCIATION; CONFLICT; CONTROLLED STUDY; DECISION MAKING; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; MENTAL DEVELOPMENT; MENTAL PERFORMANCE; MENTAL TASK; NORMAL HUMAN; PERCEPTION; PREDICTION; PROBLEM SOLVING; ADULT; FEMALE; INTUITION; MALE; MENTAL FUNCTION; PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY; SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY; THINKING;

ADOLESCENT; DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; HUMANS; INTUITION; MALE; MENTAL PROCESSES; PREJUDICE; PROBLEM SOLVING; PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY; THINKING; YOUNG ADULT;

EID: 79551522953     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19326203     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0015954     Document Type: Article

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