Dual processes and the interplay between knowledge and structure: A new parallel processing model

Psychology of Learning and Motivation - Advances in Research and Theory

Volumn 62, Issue , 2015, Pages 33-58

  Handley, Simon J ^a   Trippas, Dries ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Beliefs; Biases; Dual processes; Heuristics; Intuitive logic; Reasoning

Indexed keywords

EID: 84921609851     PISSN: 00797421     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/bs.plm.2014.09.002     Document Type: Article

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