Voluntary and mandatory skin in the game: Understanding outside directors' stock holdings

European Journal of Finance

Volumn 18, Issue 3-4, 2012, Pages 191-207

  Bhagat, Sanjai ^a   Tookes, Heather ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

^b YALE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT   (United States)

Author keywords

corporate governance; director stockholdings; equity ownership requirements; ownership and performance

Indexed keywords

EID: 84861646039     PISSN: 1351847X     EISSN: 14664364     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/1351847X.2011.579739     Document Type: Article

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