Corporate elites and corporate strategy: How demographic preferences and structural position shape the scope of the firm

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 25, Issue 6, 2004, Pages 507-524

  Jensen, Michael ^a   Zajac, Edward J ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Acquisitions; Agency theory; Corporate elites; Diversification; Upper echelons theory

Indexed keywords

DATA ACQUISITION; DECISION MAKING; MANAGEMENT; MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS; PROBLEM SOLVING; SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

AGENCY THEORY; CORPORATE ELITES; DIVERSIFICATION; UPPER-ECHELONS THEORY;

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT;

EID: 2442614059     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.393     Document Type: Review

References (67)

1. American Law Institute. 1984. Principles of Corporate Governance. Draft 2.
2. Amihud Y, Lev B. 1981. Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate mergers. Bell Journal of Economics 12: 605-616.
3. Bantel KA, Jackson SE. 1989. Top management and innovations in banking: does the composition of the top team make a difference? Strategic Management Journal, Summer Special Issue 10: 107-124.
4. Beatty RP, Zajac EJ. 1994. Managerial incentives, monitoring, and risk bearing: a study of executive compensation, ownership, and board structure in initial public offerings. Administrative Science Quarterly 39: 313-335.
5. Beyer JM, Chattopadhyay P, George E, Glick WH, ogilvie dt, Pugliese D. 1997. The selective perception of managers revisited. Academy of Management Journal 40: 716-737.
6. Breen R. 1996. Regression Models: Censored, Sample Selected, or Truncated Data. Sage: Thousand Oaks, CA.
7. Business Roundtable. 1990. Corporate Governance and American Competitiveness.
8. Cannella AA Jr, Monroe MJ. 1997. Contrasting perspectives on strategic leaders: toward a more realistic view of top managers. Journal of Management 23: 213-237.
9. Chatterjee S, Wernerfelt B. 1991. The link between resources and type of diversification: theory and evidence. Strategic Management Journal 12(1): 33-48.
10. Chattopadhyay P, Glick WH, Miller CC, Huber GP. 1999. Determinants of executive beliefs: comparing functional conditioning and social influence. Strategic Management Journal 20(8): 763-789.
11. Chintagunta PK, Jain DC, Vilcassim NJ. 1991. Investigating heterogeneity in brand preferences in logit models for panel data. Journal of Marketing Research 28: 417-428.
12. D'Aveni RA, Kesner IF. 1993. Top managerial prestige, power and tender offer response: a study of elite social networks and target firm cooperation during takeovers. Organization Science 4: 123-151.
13. Dalton DR, Daily CM, Ellstrand AE, Johnson JL. 1998. Meta-analytic reviews of board composition, leadership structure, and financial performance. Strategic Management Journal 19(3): 269-290.
14. Dearborn DC, Simon HA. 1958. Selective perception: a note on the departmental identifications of executives. Sociometry 21: 140-144.
15. Demb A, Neubauer FF. 1992. The Corporate Board. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
16. Fama EF. 1980. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy 88: 288-307.
17. Fama EF, Jensen MC. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics 26: 301-325.
18. Finkelstein S. 1992. Power in top management teams: dimensions, measurement, and validation. Academy of Management Journal 35: 505-538.
19. Finkelstein S, Hambrick DC. 1990. Top-management-team tenure and organizational outcomes: the moderating roles of managerial discretion. Administrative Science Quarterly 35: 484-503.
20. Finkelstein S, Hambrick DC. 1996. Strategic Leadership: Top Executives and Their Effects on Organizations. West: St Paul, MN.
21. Fligstein N. 1987. The intraorganizational power struggle: rise of finance personnel to top leadership in large corporations, 1919-1979. American Sociological Review 52: 44-58.
22. Fligstein N. 1990. The Transformation of Corporate Control. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA.
23. Gomez-Mejia LR, Wiseman RM. 1997. Reframing executive compensation: an assessment and outlook. Journal of Management 23: 291-374.
24. Goodstein J, Boeker W. 1991. Turbulence at the top: a new perspective on governance structure changes and strategic change. Academy of Management Journal 34: 306-330.
25. Greene WH. 1997. Econometric Analysis. Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
26. Gupta AK, Govindarajan V. 1993. Methodological issues in testing contingency theories: an assessment of alternative approaches. In Creative and Innovative Approaches to the Science of Management, Ijiri Y (ed). Quorum: Westport, CT; 453-471.
27. Hage J, Dewar R. 1973. Elite values versus organizational structure in predicting innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly 18: 279-290.
28. Haleblian J, Finkelstein S. 1993. Top management team size, CEO dominance, and firm performance: the moderating roles of environmental turbulence and discretion. Academy of Management Journal 36: 844-863.
29. Hambrick DC. 1994. Top management group: a conceptual integration and reconsideration of the 'team' label. In Research in Organizational Behavior, Staw BM, Cummings LL (eds). JAI Press: Greenwich, CT; 171-213.
30. Hambrick DC, Mason PA. 1984. Upper echelons: the organization as a reflection of its top managers. Academy of Management Review 9: 193-206.
31. Haunschild PR, Henderson AD, Davis-Blake A. 1999. CEO demographics and acquisitions: network effects of educational and functional background. In Corporate Social Capital and Liability, Leenders RTAJ, Gabbay SM (eds). Kluwer: Boston, MA; 266-283.
32. Hayes RH, Abernathy WJ. 1980. Managing our way to economic decline. Harvard Business Review 58(4): 67-77.
33. Hayward MLA, Hambrick DC. 1997. Explaining the premiums paid for large acquisitions: evidence of CEO hubris. Administrative Science Quarterly 42: 103-127.
34. Heckman JJ. 1981. The incidental parameters problem and the problem of initial conditions in estimating a discrete time-discrete data stochastic process. In Structural Analysis of Discrete Data with Econometric Applications, Manski C, McFadden D (eds). MIT Press: Cambridge, MA; 179-195.
35. Hoskisson RE, Hitt MA. 1994. Downscoping: How to Tame the Diversified Firm. Oxford University Press: New York.
36. Hoskisson RE, Hitt MA, Johnson RA, Moesel DD. 1993. Construct validity of an objective (entropy) categorical measure of diversification strategy. Strategic Management Journal 14(3): 215-235.
37. Hoskisson RE, Johnson RA, Moesel DD. 1994. Corporate divestiture intensity in restructuring firms: effects of governance, strategy, and performance. Academy of Management Journal 37: 1207-1251.
38. Jackson SE. 1992. Consequences of group composition for the interpersonal dynamics of strategic issue processing. In Advances in Strategic Management, Vol. 8, Shrivastava P, Huff AS, Dutton JE (eds). JAI Press: Greenwich, CT; 345-382.
39. Jensen MC. 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review 76: 323-329.
40. Jensen MC, Meckling WH. 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305-360.
41. Judge GG, Griffiths WE, Hill RC, Lee T-C. 1985. The Theory and Practice of Econometrics. Wiley: New York.
42. Keck SL. 1997. Top management team structure: differential effects by environmental context. Organization Science 8: 143-156.
43. Keck SL, Tushman ML. 1993. Environmental and organizational context and executive team structure. Academy of Management Journal 36: 1314-1344.
44. Lane PJ, Cannella AA Jr, Lubatkin MH. 1998. Agency problems as antecedents to unrelated diversification: Amihud and Lev reconsidered. Strategic Management Journal 19(6): 555-578.
45. Lorsch JW, MacIver E. 1989. Pawns or Potentates: The Reality of America's Corporate Boards. Harvard Business School Press: Boston, MA.
46. Mallette P, Fowler KL. 1992. Effects of board composition and stock ownership on the adoption of poison pills. Academy of Management Journal 35: 1010-1035.
47. Markides CC. 1995. Diversification, Refocusing, and Economic Performance. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.
48. McDonald JF, Moffitt RA. 1980. The uses of tobit analysis. Review of Economics and Statistics 62: 318-321.
49. McNulty T, Pettigrew AM. 1996. The contribution, power and influence of part-time board members. Corporate Governance 4: 160-179.
50. Michel JG, Hambrick DC. 1992. Diversification posture and top management team characteristics. Academy of Management Journal 35: 9-35.
51. Montgomery CA. 1982. The measurement of firm diversification: some new empirical evidence. Academy of Management Journal 28: 299-307.
52. Ocasio W. 1994. Political dynamics and the circulation of power: CEO succession in U.S. industrial corporations, 1960-1990. Administrative Science Quarterly 39: 285-312.
53. Palepu K. 1985. Diversification strategy, profit performance and the entropy measure. Strategic Management Journal 6(3): 239-255.
54. Palmer D, Barber BM. 2001. Challengers, elites, and owning families: a social class theory of corporate acquisitions in the 1960s. Administrative Science Quarterly 46: 87-120.
55. Petersen T, Koput KW. 1991. Density dependence in organizational mortality: legitimacy or unobserved heterogeneity? American Sociological Review 56: 399-409.
56. Salter MS, Weinhold WA. 1978. Diversification via acquisition: creating value. Harvard Business Review 56(4): 166-176.
57. Sayrs LW. 1989. Pooled Time Series Analysis. Sage: Newbury Park, CA.
58. Song JH. 1982. Diversification strategies and the experience of top executives of large firms. Strategic Management Journal 3(4): 377-380.
59. Tobin J. 1958. Estimation of relationships for limited dependent variables. Econometrica 26: 24-36.
60. Tosi HL, Gomez-Mejia LR. 1989. The decoupling of CEO pay and performance: an agency theory perspective. Administrative Science Quarterly 34: 169-189.
61. Waller MJ, Huber GP, Glick WH. 1995. Functional background as a determinant of executive perception. Academy of Management Journal 38: 943-974.
62. Walsh JP. 1988. Selectivity and selective perception: an investigation of managers' belief structures and information processing. Academy of Management Journal 31: 873-896.
63. Walsh JP, Seward JK. 1990. On the efficiency of internal and external corporate control mechanisms. Academy of Management Review 15: 421-458.
64. Westphal JD. 1998. Board games: how CEOs adapt to increases in structural board independence from management. Administrative Science Quarterly 43: 511-537.
65. Westphal JD, Zajac EJ. 1997. Defections from the inner circle: social exchange, reciprocity, and the diffusion of board independence in U.S. corporations. Administrative Science Quarterly 42: 161-183.
66. Wiersema MF, Bantel KA. 1992. Top management team demography and corporate strategic change. Academy of Management Journal 35: 91-121.
67. Zajac EJ, Westphal JD. 1996. Director reputation, CEO/board power, and the dynamics of board interlocks. Administrative Science Quarterly 41: 507-529.