What have we learned about the resource curse?

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 18, Issue , 2015, Pages 239-259

  Ross, Michael L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84929417662     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-052213-040359     Document Type: Review

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