Natural resources, aid, and democratization: A best-case scenario

Public Choice

Volumn 131, Issue 3-4, 2007, Pages 365-386

  Morrison, Kevin M ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Democratization; Foreign aid; Natural resources; Redistribution

Indexed keywords

EID: 34250834289     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9121-1     Document Type: Article

References (38)

1. Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J.A. (2001). A theory of political transitions. American Economic Review, 91, 938-963.
2. Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J.A. (2006). Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
3. Alesina, A., Ardagna, S., Perotti, R., & Schiantarelli, F. (2002). Fiscal policy, profits, and investment. American Economic Review. 92, 571-589.
4. Alesina, A., & Dollar, D.R. (2000). Who gives foreign aid to whom and why? Journal of Economic Growth, 5, 33-64.
5. Azam, J.-P. (1995). How to pay for the peace? A theoretical framework with references to African countries. Public Choice, 83, 173-184.
6. Azam, J.-P. (2001). The redistributive state and conflicts in Africa. Journal of Peace Research, 38, 429-444.
7. Birdsall, N., & Subramanian, A. (2004). Saving Iraq from its oil. Foreign Affairs, 83, 77-89.
8. Boix, C. (2003). Democracy and redistribution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
9. Bratton, M., & van de Walle, N. (1997). Democratic experiments in Africa: Regime transitions in comparative perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
10. Burnside, C., & Dollar, D.R. (2000). Aid, policies, and growth. American Economic Review, 90, 847-868.
11. Feyzioglu, T., Swaroop, V., & Zhu, M. (1998). A panel data analysis of the fungibility of foreign aid. World Bank Economic Review, 12, 29-58.
12. Goldsmith, A.A. (2001). Foreign aid and statehood in Africa. International Organization, 55, 123-148.
13. Ivanhoe, L.F. (2000). World oil supply - production, reserves, and EOR. Golden, CO: M. King Hubbert Center for Petroleum Supply Studies, Colorado School of Mines.
14. Jensen, N., & Wantchekon, L. (2004). Resource wealth and political regimes in Africa. Comparative Political Studies, 37, 816-841.
15. Karl, T.L. (1997). The paradox of plenty: Oil booms and petro-states. Berkeley: University of California Press.
16. Knack, S. (2004). Does foreign aid promote democracy? International Studies Quarterly, 48, 251-266.
17. Lancaster, C. (1999). Aid to Africa: So much to do, so little done. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
18. Landau, D.L. (1985). Government expenditure and economic growth in the developed countries: 1952-76. Public Choice, 47, 459-477.
19. LICUS Task Force (2002). World Bank group work in law-income countries under stress: A task force report. Washington, DC: World Bank.
20. Meltzer, A., & Richard, S. (1981). A rational theory of the size of government. Journal of Political Economy, 89, 914-927.
21. Moore, B. (1966). Social origins of dictatorship and democracy: Lord and peasant in the making of the modern world. Boston: Beacon.
22. Moore, M. (1998). Death without taxes: Democracy, state capacity, and aid dependence in the fourth world. In: M. Robinson, & G. White (Eds.), The democratic developmental state: Politics and institutional design (pp. 84-121). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
23. Moore, M. (2001). Political underdevelopment: What causes 'bad governance'. Public Management Review, 3, 385-418.
24. Mosley, P. (1992). A theory of conditionality. In: P. Mosley (Ed.), Development finance and policy reform: Essays in the theory and practice of conditionality in less developed countries (pp. 129-153). New York: St. Martin's Press.
25. Mosley, P., Harrigan, J., & Toye, J. (1995). Aid and power. London: Routledge.
26. Przeworski, A. (1991). Democracy and the market: Political and economic reforms in eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
27. Przeworski, A. (2005). Democracy as equilibrium. Public Choice, 123, 253-273.
28. Remmer, K.L. (2004). Does foreign aid promote the expansion of government? American Journal of Political Science, 48, 71-92.
29. Robinson, J.A., Torvik, R., & Verdier, T. (2003). Political foundations of the resource curse, DELTA Working Paper No. 2003-33. Paris: Départment et Laboratoire d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée.
30. Ross, M.L. (1999). The political economy of the resource curse. World Politics, 51, 297-322.
31. Ross, M.L. (2001). Does oil hinder democracy? World Politics, 53, 325-361.
32. Rueschemeyer, D., Stephens, E.H., & Stephens, J.D. (1992). Capitalist development and democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
33. Smith, B. (2004). Oil wealth and regime survival in the developing world, 1960-1999. American Journal of Political Science, 48, 232-246.
34. Svensson, J. (2000). When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality. Journal of Development Economics, 61, 61-84.
35. Svensson, J. (2003). Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it? Journal of Development Economics, 70, 381-402.
36. Tullock, G. (1971). The paradox of revolution. Public Choice, 11, 89-99.
37. van de Walle, N. (2001). African economies and the politics of permanent crisis, 1979-1999. New York: Cambridge University Press.
38. World Bank (1992). Effective implementation: Key to development impact - report of portfolio management task force. Washington, DC: World Bank.