Whither the Resource Curse?

Perspectives on Politics

Volumn 11, Issue 4, 2013, Pages 1117-1125

  Morrison, Kevin M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85011444775     PISSN: 15375927     EISSN: 15410986     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1537592713002855     Document Type: Review

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