Sovereign rents and quality of tax policy and administration

Journal of Comparative Economics

Volumn 37, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 359-371

  Knack, Stephen ^a  

^a WORLD BANK   (United States)

Author keywords

Foreign aid; Governance; Revenue mobilization; Tax administration; Tax policy

Indexed keywords

EID: 70249109688     PISSN: 01475967     EISSN: 10957227     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2009.04.001     Document Type: Article

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