Toward an alternative explanation for the resource curse: Natural resources, immigration, and democratization

Comparative Political Studies

Volumn 44, Issue 6, 2011, Pages 689-718

  Bearce, David H ^a   Laks Hutnick, Jennifer A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

democratization; immigration; resource curse

Indexed keywords

EID: 79956151442     PISSN: 00104140     EISSN: 15523829     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0010414011401211     Document Type: Article

References (47)

1. Abella, M.I. (1995). Asian migrant and contract workers in the Middle East. In R. Cohen (Ed.), The Cambridge survey of world migration (pp. 418-423). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
2. Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J.A. (2000). Democratization or repression? European Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 44, 683-693.
3. Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J.A. (2001). A theory of political transitions. American Economic Review, 91, 938-963.
4. Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J.A. (2006). Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
5. Adams, R.H., & Page, J. (2003). International migration, remittances and poverty in developing countries (Policy Research Paper 3179). Washington, DC: World Bank.
6. Al-Alkim, H.H. (1994). The GCC states in an unstable world: Foreign policy dilemmas of small states. London, UK: Saqi Books.
7. Boix, C. (2003). Democracy and redistribution. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
8. Boone, J.L. (1986). Parental investment and elite family structure in preindustrial states: A case study of late medieval-early modern Portuguese genealogies. American Anthropologist, New Series, 99, 859-878.
9. Cammett, M., & Posusney, M. P. (2010). Labor standards and labor market flexibility in the Middle East: Free trade and freer unions? Studies in Comparative International Development, 45, 250-279.
10. Cheibub, J.A., & Ghandi, J. (2004, September). Classifying political regimes: A six-fold measure of democracies and dictatorships. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.
11. Dix, R.H. (1984). Why revolutions succeed and fail. Polity, 16, 423-446.
12. Dunning, T. (2008). Crude democracy: Natural resource wealth and political regimes. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
13. Foran, J. (1993). Theories of revolution revisited: Toward a fourth generation? Sociological Theory, 11, 1-20.
14. Goldstone, J.A. (2001). Towards a fourth generation of revolutionary theory. Annual Review of Political Science, 4, 139-187.
15. Goodwin, J. (1987). Revolutionary movements in Central America: A comparative analysis (Working paper). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Department of Sociology, Center for Research on Politics and Social Organization.
16. Gould, M. (1987). Revolution in the development of capitalism: The coming of the English revolution. Berkeley: University of California Press.
17. Gylfason, T. (2001). Natural resources, education, and economic development. European Economic Review, 41, 847-859.
18. Haber, S., & Menaldo, V. (2010). Do natural resources fuel authoritarian? A reappraisal of the resource curse Unpublished manuscript, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.
19. Heston, A., Summers, R., & Aten, B. (2009). Penn world table version 6.3. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices. Retrieved fromhttp://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php.
20. Houle, C. (2009). Inequality and democracy: Why inequality harms consolidation but does not affect democratization. World Politics, 61, 589-622.
21. Hudson, V.M., & Den Boer, A. (2002). A surplus of men, a deficit of peace. International Security, 26, 5-38.
22. Humphrey, M. (1991). The changing role of Asian labour migration in the Middle East. Revue Européenne de Migrations Internationales, 7, 45-63.
23. Jensen, N.M., & Johnston, N.P. (2011). Political risk, reputation, and the resource curse. Comparative Political Studies, 44(6), 662-688.
24. Kapiszewski, A. (2001). Nationals and expatriates: Population and labour dilemmas of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Reading, UK: Garnet.
25. Kapiszewski, A. (2006, May). Arab versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries. Paper presented at the United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, Beirut, Lebanon. Retrieved fromhttp://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/EGM_Ittmig_Arab/P02_Kapiszewski.pdf.
26. Kurtz, M., & Brooks, S. (2011). Conditioning the "resource curse": Globalization, human capital, and growth in oil-rich nations. Comparative Political Studies, 44(6), 747-770.
27. Leblang, D.A., Fitzgerald, J., & Teets, J. (2009). Defying the law of gravity: The political economy of international migration. Retrieved fromhttp://ssrn.com/abstract=1421326.
28. Lipset, S.M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy. American Political Science Review, 53, 69-105.
29. Lipset, S.M. (1994). The social requisites of democracy revisited. American Sociological Review, 59, 1-22.
30. Mainwaring, S. (1992). Transitions to democracy and democratic consolidation: Theoretical and comparative issues. In S. Mainwaring, G. O'Donnell, & J. S. Valenzuela (Eds.), Issues in democratic consolidation: The new South American democracies in comparative perspective (pp. 294-342). Notre Dame, IN: University of Note Dame Press.
31. Marshall, M.G., & Jaggers, K. (2008). Polity IV Project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800-2008. Severn, MD: Center for Systemic Peace. Retrieved fromhttp://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm.
32. Midlarsky, M. (1998). Democracy and Islam: Implications for civilizational conflict and the democratic peace. International Studies Quarterly, 42, 485-511.
33. Milner, H.V., & Kubota, K. (2005). Why the move to free trade? Democracy and trade policy in the developing countries. International Organization, 59, 107-143.
34. Morrison, K.M. (2009). Oil, nontax revenue, and the redistributional foundations of regime stability. International Organization, 63, 107-138.
35. Ortega, D., & Rodriguez, F.R. (2006). Are capital shares higher in poor countries? Evidence from industrial surveys (Wesleyan Economics Working Paper 2006-023). Wesleyan University, Middletown, CT.
36. Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M.E., Cheibub, J.A., & Limongi, F. (2000). Democracy and development: Political institutions and well-being in the world, 1950-1990. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
37. Rogowski, R. (1989). Commerce and coalitions: How trade affects domestic political alignments. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
38. Ross, M.L. (2001). Does oil hinder democracy? World Politics, 53, 325-361.
39. Rudra, N. (2011). Openness and the politics of potable water. Comparative Political Studies, 44(6), 771-803.
40. Sachs, J.D. (2007). How to handle the macroeconomics of oil wealth. In M. Humphreys, J. Sachs, & J. E. Stiglitz (Eds.), Escaping the resource curse (pp. 173-193). New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
41. Taylor, C.L., & Hudson, M. (1972). World handbook of political and social indicators (2nd ed.). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
42. Teitelbaum, M.S. (1984). Immigration, refugees and foreign policy. International Organization, 38, 429-450.
43. Tilly, C. (1973). Does modernization breed revolution? Comparative Politics, 5, 425-447.
44. United Nations. (2008). United Nations population prospects. New York, NY: United Nations, Population Division.
45. Vogler, M., & Rotte, R. (1998). Determinants of international migration: Empirical evidence for migration from developing countries to Germany (IZA Discussion Paper No. 12). Retrieved fromhttp://ssrn.com/abstract=166340.
46. World Bank. (2008). World development indicators online. Retrieved fromhttp://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=12&id=4&CNO=2.
47. Zelinskii, A.M., & Nurmukhametova, I.Z. (1973). Determination of total labor input in production of refinery products. Chemistry and Technology of Fuels and Oils, 9, 448-451.