Natural resources and the tradeoff between authoritarianism and development

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 81, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 137-152

  Al Ubaydli, Omar ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Authoritarianism; Democratization; Development; Natural resources

Indexed keywords

EID: 80054757627     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.09.009     Document Type: Article

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