Constitutions and the resource curse

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 87, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 227-246

  Andersen, Jørgen Juel ^a   Aslaksen, Silje ^a  

^a NORWEGIAN UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Norway)

Author keywords

Constitution; Growth; Institutions; Political economy; Resource curse

Indexed keywords

ELECTORAL SYSTEM; NATURAL RESOURCE; POLITICAL ECONOMY; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 48049122646     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2007.12.005     Document Type: Article

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