Shaping the Saudi state: Human agency's shifting role in rentier-state formation

International Journal of Middle East Studies

Volumn 39, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 539-563

  Hertog, Steffen ^a,b  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b DURHAM UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CORRUPTION; MARKET DEVELOPMENT; POLITICAL ECONOMY; SOVEREIGNTY;

ASIA; EURASIA; MIDDLE EAST; SAUDI ARABIA;

RICHES;

EID: 38549178918     PISSN: 00207438     EISSN: 14716380     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020743807071073     Document Type: Article

References (202)

1. Cf. Kiren Chaudhry, The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East (Ithaca, N. Y: Cornell University Press, 1997);
2. Jacques Delacroix, "The Distributive State in the World System," Studies in Comparative International Development 15 (Fall 1990);
3. Giacomo Luciani, "Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework," in The Arab State, ed. Giacomo Luciani (London: Routledge 1990), 65-84;
4. Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1997).
5. Recent additions to this academic growth industry include Nathan J. Citino, From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Sa'ud, and the Making of U.S.-Saudi Relations (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2002);
6. Thomas Lippman, Inside the Mirage: America's Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia (Boulder, Co.: Westview, 2004);
7. Rachel Bronson, Thicker than Oil: The U.S. and Saudi Arabia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
8. Sarah Yizraeli, The Remaking of Saudi Arabia: The Struggle between King Sa'ud and Crown Prince Faysal, 1953-1962 (Tel Aviv: Dayan Center, 1997).
9. Cf. Robert Vitalis's review in International Journal of Middle East Studies 31 (November 1999): 659.
10. Delacroix, "The Distributive State" Gregory Gause, Oil Monarchies (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994);
11. Dirk Vandewalle, Libya Since Independence (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1998);
12. Nazih Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State (London: I. B. Tauris, 1995), 256.
13. Chaudhry, The Price of Wealth, 269-319.
14. Luciani, "Allocation vs. Production States"
15. Hazem Beblawi, "The Rentier State in the Arab World," in Luciani, Arab State;
16. Delacroix, "The Distributive State."
17. Despite protestations to the contrary, such determinism strongly underlies the "resource curse" account in Karl, Paradox of Plenty
18. Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
19. Michael Herb, All in the Family (Albany, N.Y: State University of New York Press, 1999).
20. Philby has allegedly reported Ibn Sa'ud making this quote from the Qur'an; Jones to USSD, "Six months of King Saud," embassy report, 10 May 1954, U.S. Records on Saudi Affairs (henceforth USRSA), vol. 2 (Slough, U.K.: Archive Editions, 1997).
21. Ali Mashhour al-Seflan, "The Essence of Tribal Leaders' Participation, Responsibilities, and Decisions in Some Local Government Activities in Saudi Arabia" (PhD diss., Claremont Graduate School, 1980), 81.
22. See the list of administrative units in 'Abd al-'Aziz's court in Alexei Vasiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia (London: Saqi, 2000), 293.
23. Yizraeli, The Remaking, 101;
24. Soliman Soliman, "Constitutional and Judicial Organizationin Saudi Arabia" (PhD diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1970), 8;
25. Ibrahim Al-Awaji, "Bureaucracy and Society in Saudi Arabia" (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 1971), 45.
26. Arthur N. Young, Saudi Arabia: The Making of a Financial Giant (New York: New York University Press, 1983), 23
27. Ibid., 20.
28. United Kingdom Public Record Office, Foreign Office, 371/75507 (E 10334) (henceforth PRO, FO).
29. Embassy to the USSD, "Reforms Undertaken by the Crown Prince," 16 November 1952, USRSA, vol. 2.
30. Letter from Philby to Barker, Jidda, 6 August 1953, "misc" file, Philby archive, St. Antony's College, Oxford.
31. Yizraeli, The Remaking, 20.
32. Summer Scott Huyette, Political Adaptation in Saudi Arabia (London: Westview, 1985), 106.
33. "...the merchants all, to a greater or less [sic] degree, depend on the spending power of the court" brief for talks with USA, January 1956, PRO, FO 371/120754 (ES 1015/3).
34. "Chambers of Commerce in Saudi Arabia," 14 April 1956, box 2, folder51, Mulligan Papers, Georgetown University (henceforth Mulligan Papers).
35. Ministry of Commerce," 11 March 1957, box 9, folder 1, Mulligan Papers.
36. Taha Osman El-Farra, "The Effects of Detribalizing the Bedouins on the Internal Cohesion of the Saudi State" (PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1973).
37. Citino, From Arab Nationalism to OPEC, 64-65;
38. Robert Lacey, The Kingdom (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981), 302.
39. Robert Vitalis, America's Kingdom (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007).
40. Cf. numerous biographies in the Mulligan papers.
41. Vitalis, America's Kingdom, 143.
42. "Dammam Municipal Elections," 24 September 1960, box 3, folder 61, Mulligan Papers.
43. "Municipalities in Saudi Arabia," May 1956, box 5, folder 18, Mulligan Papers.
44. "Consultative Council," 29 December 1956, box 9, folder 1, Mulligan Papers, 15.
45. Ulama' were reported to be loyal to both Sa'ud and Faisal; "Faisal's Character" (n.d.), box 1, folder 70, Mulligan Papers. On the 'ulama's effective political abstinence, see Stephane Lacroix, "A Political Sociology of Islamism in Saudi Arabia" (PhD diss., Sciences Po/Paris, 2007);
46. Abdulaziz Al-Fahad, "From Exclusivism to Accommodation: Doctrinal and Legal Evolution of Wahhabism," NYU Law Review 79 (May 2004).
47. Sa'ud was reported early on as being uninfluenced by the 'ulama'; PRO/FO 371/82639 (ES 1015/1).
48. Embassy to USSD, "Reforms Under-taken," USRSA, vol. 2.
49. Hare to USSD, telegram 714, 4 June 1951, USRSA, vol. 3.
50. Citino, From Arab Nationalism, 64, 78.
51. Jones to USSD, telegram, 13 October 1953, USRSA, vol. 2. Lack of coordination had existed since the creation of the Saudi state. A British dispatch in early 1954 commented, "Hitherto each Minister has done whatever he found within his pleasure and his power" 1953 annual review, 1 January 1954, PRO, FO 371/110095 (ES 1011/1).
52. 1954 annual review, 6 January 1955, PRO, FO 371/113872 (ES 1011/1).
53. Hare to USSD, telegram 714.
54. Embassy to USSD, telegram 537, 3 April 1952, USRSA, vol. 3.
55. 1953 annual review, PRO, FO 371/110095 (ES 1011/1).
56. Stein to USSD, "Resignation of Prince Talal bin Abdulaziz as Minister of Communication," 30 April 1955, USRSA, vol. 5. In November 1955, up and coming Prince Sultan would become head of the Ministry of Communications, once again recreated as an independent entity.
57. Various biographical sketches, Mulligan Papers; Sweeney to USSD, telegram, 14 April 1959, USRSA, vol. 5.
58. Embassy to USSD, "Mohammed Suroor to Supervise Pilgrimage and Broadcasting," 22 December 1952, USRSA, vol. 2.
59. "Inspector of the Diplomatic and Consular Service" Embassy to USSD, news summary for September, 6 November 1955, USRSA, vol. 4.
60. One rather embarrassing example was Saudi United Nations ambassador Baroudi, who was useless by the admission of his boss Omar Saqqaf but to whom Faisal was personally obliged; "Saudi Arabia: Government Officials," United Kingdom, Public Record Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 8/1168 (henceforth PRO, FCO). Similarly, Ibrahim Suwayyel had no visible qualification for becoming minister of agriculture apart from being loyal and trusted; biographical sketch, box 2, folder 4, Mulligan Papers.
61. Biographical sketches of Abdalmuhsin, Badr, and Fawwaz, box 1, folder 69, Mulligan papers.
62. In addition to Yizraeli, there is Gary Samore, "Royal Family Politics in Saudi Arabia (1953-82)" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1983).
63. "Faisal's Character," box 1, folder 70, Mulligan Papers.
64. Yizraeli, The Remaking, 153.
65. On the parallel plans for broadcasting authorities cf. "Resignation of Amir Nawwaf," 1 August 1961, folder 8, box 3, Mulligan Papers.
66. George Lipsky, Saudi Arabia: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture (New Haven, Conn.: HRAF Press, 1959), 96.
67. Discussions with Saudi bankers, Riyadh, December 2005; Vitalis, America's Kingdom, 168.
68. Michael Field, The Merchants: The Big Business Families of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf (New York: Overlook Press, 1984), 101.
69. Young, The Making, 78.
70. Examples include Sa'ud's confidant Id bin Salem ("The Royal Cabinet," 24 August 1960, box 3, folder 61, Mulligan Papers); Adnan Khashoggi, who reportedly was given his first break by Talal and Nawaf before becoming a client of Fahd and Sultan ("Adnan Muhammad Khashoggi," October 1971, box 1, folder 70, Mulligan Papers); Ibrahim Shakir, who was a client of Minister of Finance 'Abdallah Sulaiman (Consulate Basra to USSD, enclosure no. 1 to dispatch no. 111, 4 May 1950, USRSA, vol. 2); Faisal's brother-in-law Kamal Adham and the Alireza merchant family, all supported by Faisal; Field, The Merchants, 110.
71. The Royal Cabinet," box 3, folder 61, Mulligan Papers.
72. Field, The Merchants, 110;
73. "Muhammad Omar Tawfiq" (n.d.), box 2, folder 4; "Faisal's Character," box 1, folder 70, Mulligan Papers; Huyette, Political Adaptation, 69.
74. Interviews with former senior bureaucrats, Riyadh, between 2003 and 2006.
75. Only 2 percent of 271 "top officials" in a 1960s survey were born to tribesmen (Awaji, "Bureaucracy and Society," 169-76). Government charts from 1947 and 1961 show several urban notable family names in senior positions but no tribal names; box 1, folder 9, Mulligan Papers.
76. J. B. Armitage to R. McGregor, 31 July 1971, PRO, FCO 8/1733.
77. Biographical sketches of Fahd and Sultan, box 1, folder 70, Mulligan Papers.
78. Various biographical sketches, Mulligan Papers.
79. Department of the Air Force, "Visit of HRH Prince Misha'al Abdulaziz al Saud, Minister of Defense, Saudi Arabi [sic], including 2 biographies," 6 November 1951, USRSA, vol. 2.
80. Stein to USSD, "Resignation of Prince Talal."
81. Vitalis, review of Chaudhry, p. 661.
82. Embassy to USSD, "Transmittal of Charts of Saudi Government Organization," 14 November 1951, USRSA, vol. 2.
83. Robert Vitalis, personal communication, November 2005.
84. Jones to USSD, establishment of Saudi Ministry of Economy, 19 July 1953, USRSA, vol. 3.
85. "Discussion with Hafiz Wahba," 23 December 1961, box 3, folder 10, Mulligan Papers.
86. Embassy to USSD, "Transmittal of Charts."
87. Toomey to USSD, "Saudi Press Criticizes the Minister of Commerce, Sheikh Mohammed Alireza," 2 October 1958, USRSA, vol. 5; Morris to FO, 25 November 1958, PRO, FO 371/132656 (BS1015/16).
88. "Ministry of Commerce," 24 August 1960, box 3, folder 61; biographical sketch Alireza family (n.d.), box 1, folder 170, Mulligan Papers.
89. Embassy to USSD, biweekly report for 1st half of May, 11 June 1957, USRSA, vol. 4.
90. Huyette, Political Adaptation, 105.
91. Awaji, "Bureaucracy and Society," 130, 217;
92. Taha EI-Farra, "The Effects of Detribalizing the Bedouins on the Cohesion of an Emerging State: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia" (PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1973), 73.
93. Embassy to USSD, "Financial Regulations Issued by Crown Prince," 20 December 1952, USRSA, vol. 2.
94. Interview with senior Arab economic adviser, Riyadh, April 2004.
95. Hare to USSD, "Promotions within Ministry of Finance," 2 March 1953, USRSA, vol. 3. The son of 'Abdallah bin Adwan today serves on the advisory body of King 'Abdallah's Supreme Economic Council.
96. David Holden and Richard Johns, The House of Saud (London: Pan Books, 1982), 182.
97. Young, The Making, 39, 61.
98. Philips to Anthony Eden, 16 April 1953, PRO, FO 371/104860 (ES110511);
99. Young (The Making, 50) mentions more than twenty signatures.
100. Embassy to USSD, "Financial Regulations."
101. 1945 annual review, PRO, FO 371/52823 (E 2249).
102. Ibid.
103. Hare to USSD, telegram 31x[illegible], 17 July 1952; USRSA, vol. 3;
104. Pelham to FO, 8 August 1953, PRO/FO 371/104854 (ES 1016/1).
105. Embassy to USSD, telegram, 17 July 1952, USRSA, vol. 3; revision of the list of leading personalities in Saudi Arabia, 1946, PRO, FO 371/52832.
106. Vasiliev, History of Saudi Arabia, 298.
107. Field, The Merchants, 108.
108. Other high-ranking Ministry of Finance officials in Sulaiman's time, such as Lebanese Najib Salha, had a degree of maneuverability in their respective administrative units and established their own clienteles. Salha reportedly "made" the Kaaki family (who were to found the large National Commercial Bank) during World War II; revision of leading personalities, PRO, FO 371/52832.
109. In the early 1950s, for example, Siraj Zahran and Mohammad Zaidan, both subsequently promment business names, were assistants to Mohammad Suroor, adviser to Sulaiman and head of the purchasing department in Riyadh. Mohammad bin Laden, who built a palace for King 'Abd al-'Aziz, was director of public construction; Consulate Basra to USSD, 4 May 1950, USRSA, vol. 2; Embassy to USSD, "Transmittal of Charts."
110. Hare to USSD, "Appointment of Hasan Sharbath as Minister of State," 28 July 1952, USRSA, vol. 2.
111. Ibid.
112. Foreign Office minutes, 24 January 1958, PRO, FO 371/133156 (ES 1111).
113. Young, The Making, 14.
114. Ibid., 64.
115. Embassy to USSD, "Financial Regulations."
116. Beeley to FO, 15 June 1955, PRO, FO 371/114888 (ES 1111/2)
117. Aramco generally urged the princes to streamline their government, and so did the embassy; Embassy to USSD, "Reforms Undertaken."
118. Pelham to FO, 18 January 1955, PRO, FO 114888 (ES 1111/1).
119. "Evaluative Study Number 2: Assistance to the Institute of Public Administration," October 1970, box 11, Ford Foundation archive, Institute of Public Administration, Riyadh (henceforth Ford Foundation archive).
120. Heath to USSD, telegram, 27 November 1959, USRSA, vol. 5.
121. Yizraeli, The Remaking, 53.
122. SAMA's first annual report in 1960 stressed the achievement of budgetary order, contrasting it with the preceding chaos; WED, 23 January 1959, 45 (and subsequently WED, 8 January 1960, p. 7; MEED, 31 August 1962, p. 382);
123. cf. also Embassy to USSD, fortnightly summary for 1-15 December, 5 January 1959, USRSA, vol. 4.
124. Embassy to USSD, telegram, 14 April 1959, USRSA, vol. 5.
125. "Faisal's Character," box 1, folder 70, Mulligan Papers.
126. Heath to USSD, "Over-centralization of Authority in the Saudi Government," 22 July 1959, USRSA, vol. 5.
127. Tbe austerity starting with the 1959 budget did not imply rationalization all across the board but mostly hit the budgets of Sa'ud and his minister sons, whereas Faisal's allies saw constant or increasing allocations; MEED, 23 January 1959, 45; 6 January 1961, 8.
128. Lacey, The Kingdom, 258-371.
129. These advisors grew increasingly unpopular throughout the 1950s; PRO, FO 371/127150 (ES 1015/8); 114874 (ES 1015/6).
130. When Talal tried to build a popular following during a tour through the eastern province, merchants proved uninterested and young professionals refused to engage with him; "Saudi National Legislative Council," 2 August 1961, box 3, folder 8, Mulligan Papers.
131. "Complete Powers" (n.d.), box 6, folder 12, Mulligan Papers.
132. Vitalis, America's Kingdom, 221.
133. Biographical sketch Hisham Nazer, box 1, folder 69, Mulligan Papers; various other biographies.
134. The budget volume increased from 1.4 billion Saudi riyals in 1960 to 5.8 billion in 1968 and 1969; MEED, 8 January 1960, 8; 4 October 1968, 976.
135. Huyette, Political Adaptation, 74
136. Biographical sketch Muhammad Abalkhail, 1972, box 1, folder 70, Mulligan Papers.
137. Samore, "Royal Family Politics," 232.
138. Biographical sketch Khalid, June 1968, box 1, folder 70, Mulligan Papers.
139. Already in 1965, a volume of 100 million pounds was envisaged; MEED, 19 November 1965, 526.
140. "Form-At-A-Glance-Saudi Arabia," June 1973, PRO, FCO 8/2105; "Organization and Administration of the Ministry of Defense and Civil Aviation" (n.d.), box 18, Ford Foundation arcluve.
141. At least up to 1972 it also lacked an operations center and adequate maps; "Report on Saudi Arabian National Guard," 11 October 1972, PRO, FCO 8/1915;
142. "Management Survey Report National Guard," March 1966, box 23, Ford Foundation archive.
143. Yizraeli, The Remaking, 96, 110.
144. Regarding public works, for example, the Ford Foundation commented, "Each Ministry is more or less an independent autonomous unit as to policy determination, budget formation, fiscal control and over-all administration," "Interim Report on Establishment of an Integrated Public Works Agency," May 1965, box 17, Ford Foundation archive.
145. Abdullah Mohammed Binsaleh, "The Civil Service and Its Regulation in Saudi Arabia" (PhD diss., Claremont Graduate School, 1982), 65;
146. Vasiliev, History of Saudi Arabia, 404.
147. Awaji, "Bureaucracy and Society," 162;
148. David Edens and William Snavely, "Planning for Economic Development in Saudi Arabia," Middle East Journal 21 (Winter 1970): 17;
149. "Evaluative Study Number 2: Assistance to the Institute of Public Administration," October 1970, box 11, Ford Foundation archive.
150. The CPO acquired political clout only from 1968 on, under Hisham Nazer, who had direct access to the king; Morris to Douglas-Home, 3 February 1971, PRO, FCO 8/1742.
151. Financial Management Program & System, September 1970, box 1, Ford Foundation archive, 5.
152. Rothnie to Wright, 22 August 1974, PRO, FCO 8/2332.
153. Ahmed H. al-Hamoud, "The Reform of the Reform: A Critical and Empirical Assessment of the 1977 Saudi Civil Service Reform" (PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1991), 178, 268.
154. Sweeney to USSD, telegram, 26 June 1958, USRSA, vol. 5.
155. Heath to USSD, telegram, 30 July 1958, USRSA, vol. 5.
156. Annual Review 1968, 14 January 1969, FCO 8/1166;
157. Binsaleh, 65;
158. Huyette, 106; Qualifying exams, as far as administered, were often tailor-made for specific individuals;
159. Awaji, "Bureaucracy and Society," 139.
160. The British embassy in Jeddah decried the "prevalence of corruption at all levels" Annual review for 1968, PRO, FCO 8/1166.
161. Interview with James Craig, former British ambassador to Saudi Arabia (1979-84), who had also been posted in the kingdom in the late 1960s. Oxford, June 2005.
162. Lippman, Inside the Mirage, 146.
163. "Under King Feisal... If corruption has not disappeared, it is circumscribed" Morris to Stewart, "The Saudi Arabian Internal Scene," January 1969, PRO, FCO 8/1165.
164. It was an insider deal of Faisal's brother-in-law Kamal Adham that reportedly prompted the clash between Faisal and Minister of Petroleum Abdallah Tariqi leading to Tariqi's dismissal, in 1962 (Lacey, The Kingdom, 339). Similarly, Faisal decided to help out the bin Laden family through road contracts in the late 1960s, after the head of the family died in a plane crash: "Saudi Arabia: A Reappraisal," Geneva: Business International, September 1985, 183.
165. MEED, 26 October 1967, 10 July 1970; Field, 110.
166. Cf. MEED, 14 June 1968, 553.
167. Contacts in the administration were needed for obtaining contracts. Faisal knew of the systems of the middleman but turned a blind eye; Rothme to Wright, PRO, FCO 8/2332.
168. Al-Hamoud, "Reform of the Reform," 184-86, 268.
169. Armitage to McGregor, 31 July 71, PRO, FCO 8/1733; Report on the Institute of Public Administration, April 1969, box 9, Ford Foundation archive.
170. Interview with Soliman Solaim, former Saudi Minister of Commerce, Riyadh, December 2005.
171. Government expenditure grew from 6.4 billion Saudi riyals in 1970 to 234 billion in 1980;
172. SAMA Annual Report 2003, 380.
173. Rayed Krimly, "The Political Economy of Rentier States: A Case Study of Saudi Arabia" (PhD diss., George Washington University, 1993), 231;
174. MEED 8 January 1960, 8; 4 October 1968, 976.
175. Bader H. al-Ammaj, "Administration in Traditional Society: The Case of Recruitment and Selection in Public Sector Employment in Saudi Arabia" (PhD diss., University of Southampton, 1993);
176. Ahmed H. al-Hamoud, "Reform of the Reform" Ahmed Mohmed Al-Tawati, "The Civil Service of Saudi Arabia: Problems and Prospects" (PhD diss., University of West Virginia, 1976).
177. MEED, 1 June 1979, 3.
178. Form-At-A-Glance-Saudi Arabia, June 1973, PRO, FCO 8/2105.
179. Report on Saudi National Guard, 11 October 1972, PRO, FCO 8/1915
180. Phone interview with Andrew Green, former British ambassador to Saudi Arabia, June 2005.
181. The number of budgeted state employees more than tripled from 1971-72 to 1981-82 (from 96, 781 to 353,229, although many posts could not be filled initially);
182. al-Hamoud, "Reform of the Reform," 382.
183. For a description of agency-based princely clientelism today, see Madawi Al-Rasheed, "Circles of Power: Royals and Society in Saudi Arabia," in Saudi Arabia in the Balance, ed. Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman (London: Hurst, 2005).
184. "Saudi Arabia: Defence: National Guard," 1969, PRO/FCO 8/1198;
185. Craig to Stewart, "Internal Security in Saudi Arabia," 14 August 1969, PRO/FCO 8/1165.
186. MEED, 1 June 1979, 25;
187. Holden and Johns, House of Saud, 508.
188. MEED, 4 February 1983, 41.
189. Interview with Michael Gillibrand, former adviser to the Saudi government, London, November 2005.
190. Ammaj, "Administration in Traditional Society," 141.
191. Interview with former senior Saudi bureaucrat, Riyadh, May 2004.
192. On the ports authority, see Holden and Johns, House of Saud, 404.
193. Fahd played a prominent role in cultivating these young Turks; discussion with Saudi businessman, London, July 2005.
194. Steffen Hertog, "Segmented Clientelism: The Politics of Economic Reform in Saudi Arabia" (PhD diss., University of Oxford, 2006).
195. Interview with former Saudi deputy minister, Riyadh, November 2005.
196. Cf. Calvin Allen and W. Lynn Rigsbee, Oman under Qaboos: From Coup to Constitution (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 34-64.
197. Yizraeli, The Remaking, 89.
198. Consulate Basra to USSD, 4 May 1950, USRSA, vol 2.
199. The Saudi example shows that elite power balancing at crucial historical junctures can also work against the gradual expansion of princes into dynastic rentier states as described by Herb, All in the Family.
200. John Davis, Libyan Politics: Tribe and Revolution (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1987).
201. Terry Lynn Karl mentions the "top-down yet divided organisation" of Venezuelan parties, with various personalized patronage structures all vying for state access, indicating equivalent patterns of fragmentation (see Karl, Paradox of Plenty, 107). Members of the ruling Sabah family built ministerial fiefdoms in Kuwait as early as the 1950s (Crystal, Oil and Politics, 13), and the Qatari state is similarly divided among various fiefs (discussion with Jill Crystal, Paris, January 2005). Several of the Libyan ministries in the 1950s and 1960s, the decades of early oil, were also run as patrimonial fiefdoms;
202. Vandewalle, Libya Since Independence, 48.