The Political Resource Curse: An Empirical Re-evaluation

Political Research Quarterly

Volumn 67, Issue 4, 2014, Pages 783-794

  Wiens, David ^a   Poast, Paul ^b   Clark, William Roberts ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

authoritarianism; democratization; oil; resource curse; resource dependence

Indexed keywords

EID: 84924295992     PISSN: 10659129     EISSN: 1938274X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1065912914543836     Document Type: Article

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