Rent seeking and regime stability in rentier states

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 27, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 740-748

  Bjorvatn, Kjetil ^a   Naghavi, Alireza ^b,c  

^a NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Norway)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA   (Italy)

^c FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI   (Italy)

Author keywords

Conflict; Patronage employment; Rent seeking; Rentier states; Resource rents; Stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 80053133223     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.05.007     Document Type: Article

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