Oil rents, corruption, and state stability: Evidence from panel data regressions

European Economic Review

Volumn 55, Issue 7, 2011, Pages 955-963

  Arezki, Rabah ^a   Brückner, Markus ^b  

^a INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE   (Australia)

Author keywords

Corruption; Oil rents; State participation; State stability

Indexed keywords

CORRUPTION; GOVERNANCE APPROACH; OIL TRADE; PANEL DATA; POLITICAL CONFLICT; POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY; STATE ROLE; STATE-BUSINESS RELATIONS; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 80052557079     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.03.004     Document Type: Article

References (24)

1. Bhattacharyya S., Hodler R. Natural resources, democracy, and corruption. European Economic Review 2010, 54:608-621.
2. Blundell R., Bond S. Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics 1998, 87:115-143.
3. Collier P., Hoeffler A. Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic Papers 2004, 56:563-596.
4. Collier P., Hoeffler A. Testing the neocon agenda: democracy in resource-rich societies. European Economic Review 2009, 53:293-308.
5. Fearon J., Laitin D. Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. American Political Science Review 2003, 97:75-90.
6. Fearon J. Primary commodity exports and civil war. Journal of Conflict Resolution 2005, 49:483-507.
7. Freedom House, 2009. Freedom in the World Country Ratings, 1972-2007.
8. Haber S., Menaldo V. Do natural resources fuel authoritarianism? A reappraisal of the resource curse. American Political Science Review 2011, 105(1):1-26.
9. Hirshleifer J. The Dark Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of Conflict Theory 2001, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
10. Isham J., Pritchett L., Woolcock M., Busby G. The varieties of resource experience: natural resource export structures and the political economy of economic growth. World Bank Economic Review 2005, 19:141-174.
11. International Energy Agency (2006). International Energy Annual 2006.
12. Karl T. The social and political consequences of oil. Encyclopedia of Energy 2004, Elsevier, San Diego. C. Cleveland (Ed.).
13. Keefer P., Stasavage D. The limits of delegation: veto players, central bank independence, and the credibility of monetary policy. American Political Science Review 2003, 47:407-423.
14. Kilian L. Not all oil price shocks are alike: disentangling demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market. American Economic Review 2009, 99:1053-1069.
15. Marshall M., Jaggers K. Polity IV Project: Dataset Users' Manual 2005, Center for Global Policy, George Mason University, 〈www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity〉 (Polity IV Data Computer File, Version p4v2004. Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, College Park, MD.).
16. McPherson, C. State participation in the natural resources sectors: evolution, issues and outlook. Daniel, P., Goldsworthy, B., Keen, M., McPherson, C. (Eds.), Handbook of Oil, Gas and Mineral Taxation. IMF, Washington, DC (Chapter 10), forthcoming.
17. Ossowski, R., Villafuerte M., Medas P.A., and Thomas T. (2008). Managing the Oil Revenue Boom: The Role of Fiscal Institutions. International Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper No. 260.
18. Political Risk Services, 2009. International Country Risk Guide.
19. Robinson J., Torvik R., Verdier T. Political foundations of the resource curse. Journal of Development Economics 2006, 2:447-468.
20. Ross M. Does oil hinder democracy?. World Politics 1999, 53:325-361.
21. Ross M. The political economy of the resource curse. World Politics 1999, 51:297-322.
22. Svensson J. Eight questions about corruption. Journal of Economic Perspectives 2005, 19:19-42.
23. Treisman D. What have we learned about the causes of corruption from 10 years of cross-national research?. Annual Review of Political Science 2007, 10:211-244.
24. Tsui K. More oil, less democracy: evidence from worldwide crude oil discoveries. Economic Journal 2010, 121(551):89-115.