Natural resources and institutional development

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 26, Issue 2, 2014, Pages 197-221

  Wiens, David ^a,b  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Democratization; economic growth; resource curse

Indexed keywords

EID: 84898985486     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: 14603667     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951629813493835     Document Type: Article

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