Behavioural game theory: Thinking, learning and teaching

Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour: Game Theory, Experiments and Bounded Rationality

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 120-180

  Camerer, Colin F ^a   Ho, Teck Hua ^b   Chong, Juin Kuan ^c  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84925169411     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1057/9780230523371_8     Document Type: Chapter

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