Features of experimentally observed bounded rationality

European Economic Review

Volumn 42, Issue 3-5, 1998, Pages 413-436

  Selten, Reinhard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Bounded rationality; Experiments; Strategic interaction

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000998041     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(97)00148-7     Document Type: Article

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