Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 97-132

  Mookherjee, Dilip ^a,b   Sopher, Barry ^c  

^a BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b INDIAN STATISTICAL INSTITUTE   (India)

^c RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002159270     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0540     Document Type: Article

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