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Volumn 104, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 16-47

Detecting failures of backward induction: Monitoring information search in sequential bargaining

Author keywords

Bargaining; Behavioral economics; Behavioral game theory; Bounded rationality; Experimental economics; Fairness; Limited cognition

Indexed keywords


EID: 0036272188     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2850     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (281)

References (67)
  • 17
    • 84883972297 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • "Bargaining Outcomes as the Result of Coordinated Expectations"
    • working paper, Middlebury College, October
    • (2000)
    • Carpenter, J.P.1
  • 18
    • 85031456989 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • "Social Preferences: A Model and New Evidence"
    • Department of Economics working paper, University of California, Berkeley
    • (2000)
    • Charmes, G.1    Rabin, M.R.2
  • 35
    • 85031453710 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • "Predicting by Analogy and Limited Foresight in Games"
    • working paper CERAS and University College London, also available at
    • (1999)
    • Jeheil, P.1
  • 53
  • 56
  • 60
    • 0003531709 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • "Evidence for Learning to Learn Behavior in Normal Form Games"
    • working paper Florida State University, available at
    • (1999)
    • Salmon, T.C.1
  • 67
    • 0003415493 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • "Ignoring the Rationality of Others"
    • working paper, Harvard Business School
    • (2000)
    • Weizsacker, G.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.