Experience-weighted attraction learning in sender-receiver signaling games

Economic Theory

Volumn 16, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 689-718

  Anderson, Christopher M ^a   Camerer, Colin F ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Equilibrium refinement; Game theory experiments; Learning; Signaling games

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034340489     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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