Does observation of others affect learning in strategic environments? An experimental study

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 131-152

  Duffy, John ^a   Feltovich, Nick ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON   (United States)

Author keywords

Best shot game; Information; Observation; Reinforcement; Social learning; Ultimatum game

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033481048     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820050102     Document Type: Article

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