On "reputation" refinements with heterogeneous beliefs

Econometrica

Volumn 65, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 369-374

  Battigalli, Pierpaolo ^a   Watson, Joel ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001466961     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2171897     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. BATTIGALLI, P. (1994): "Giochi ad Informazione Incompleta con Aspettative Soggettive Mutuamente Incoerenti," mimeo, Politecnico di Milano.
2. _ (1996): "Strategic Independence and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, 70, 201-234.
3. CRIPPS, M., K. SCHMIDT, AND J. THOMAS (1993): "Reputation in Perturbed Repeated Games," University of Bonn Discussion Paper A-410.
4. FUDENBERG, D., AND D. K. LEVINE (1989): "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Econometrica, 57, 759-778.
5. GUL, F. (1991): "On the Bayesian View in Game Theory and Economics," Research Paper #1991, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University.
6. SCHMIDT, K. (1993): "Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests," Econometrica, 61, 325-351.
7. WATSON, J. (1993): "A 'Reputation' Refinement without Equilibrium," Econometrica, 61, 199-205.
8. _ (1994): "Strategy Pertubations in Repeated Games as Rules of Thumb," UCSD Working Paper 94-20.
9. _ (1996): "Reputation in Repeated Games with no Discounting," Games and Economic Behavior, 15, 82-109.