Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Coordination Games: Probability Rules, Heterogeneity, and Time-Variation

Journal of Mathematical Psychology

Volumn 42, Issue 2-3, 1998, Pages 305-326

  Camerer, Colin ^a   Ho, Teck Hua ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001240712     PISSN: 00222496     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jmps.1998.1217     Document Type: Article

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