Sophisticated experience-weighted attraction learning and strategic teaching in repeated games

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 104, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 137-188

  Camerer, Colin F ^a   Ho, Teck Hua ^b   Chong, Juin Kuan ^c  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^c NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036268277     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2002.2927     Document Type: Article

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