What makes markets allocationally efficient?

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 112, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 603-630

  Gode, Dhananjay K ^a   Sunder, Shyam ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0010122672     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/003355397555307     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. Becker, Gary S., "Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory," Journal of Political Economy, LXX (1962), 1-13.
2. Chamberlin, Edward H., "An Experimental Imperfect Market," Journal of Political Economy, LVI (1948), 95-108.
3. De Long, J. Bradford, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers, and Robert J. Waldmann, "Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets," Journal of Political Economy, XCVIII (1990), 703-38.
4. Easley, David, and John Ledyard, "Theories of Price Formation and Exchange in Double Oral Auctions," The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories, and Evidence, D. Friedman and J. Rust, eds., Santa Fe Institute Series in the Sciences of the Complexity, Proceedings Volume XV (New York, NY: Addison-Wesley, 1993).
5. Friedman, Daniel, "On the Efficiency of Experimental Double Auction Markets," American Economic Review, LXXIV (1984), 60-72.
6. Gode, Dhananjay K., and Shyam Sunder, "Some Issues in Electronic Modeling of Double Auctions with Computer Traders," Working Paper, Carnegie Mellon University, 1992.
7. Gode, Dhananjay K, and Shyam Sunder, "Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero Intelligence (ZI) Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality," Journal of Political Economy, CI (1993a), 119-37.
8. Gode, Dhananjay K., and Shyam Sunder, "Lower Bounds of Efficiency of Surplus Extraction in Double Auctions," The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories, and Evidence, D. Friedman and J. Rust, eds., Santa Fe Institute Series in the Sciences of the Complexity, Proceedings Volume XV (New York, NY: Addison-Wesley, 1993b).
9. Hayek, Friederich A., "The Uses of Knowledge in Society," American Economic Review, XXXV (September 1945), 519-30.
10. Holt, Charles A., Loren W. Langan, and Anne P. Villamil, "Market Power in Oral Double Auctions," Economic Inquiry, XXIV (January 1986), 107-23.
11. North, Douglass C., Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
12. Osborne Martin J., and Ariel Rubinstein, Bargaining and Markets (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, Inc., 1990).
13. Plott, Charles R., and Shyam Sunder, "Efficiency of Controlled Security Markets with Insider Information: An Application of Rational Expectation Models," Journal of Political Economy, XC (1982), 663-98.
14. Plott, Charles R., and Shyam Sunder, "Rational Expectations and the Aggregation of Diverse Information in Laboratory Security Markets," Econometrica, LVI (1988), 1085-1118.
15. Rust John., J. H. Miller, and R. Palmer, "Behavior of Trading Automata in a Computerized Double Auction Market," The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories, and Evidence, D. Friedman and J. Rust, eds., Santa Fe Institute Series in the Sciences of the Complexity, Proceedings Volume XV (New York, NY: Addison-Wesley, 1993).
16. Simon, Herbert A., The Sciences of the Artificial, Second Edition (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981).
17. Smith, Adam, The Wealth of Nations, Andrew Skinner, ed. (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Limited, 1776).
18. Smith, Vernon. L., "An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior," Journal of Political Economy LXX (1962), 111-37.
19. Sunder, Shyam, "Experimental Asset Markets: A Survey," Chapter 6 in Handbook of Experimental Economics, A. Roth and John Kagel, eds. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp 445-500.
20. Wilson, Robert B., "On Equilibria of Bid-Ask Markets," Arrow and the Ascent of Modern Economic Theory, George R. Feiwel ed. (New York : New York University Press, 1987).