A theory of jump bidding in ascending auctions

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 62, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 144-164

  Isaac, R Mark ^a   Salmon, Timothy C ^a   Zillante, Arthur ^b  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science   (United States)

Author keywords

Ascending auctions; Auction theory; Jump bidding

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845563412     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.04.009     Document Type: Article

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