Decentralized management of common property resources: Experiments with a centuries-old institution

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 51, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 217-247

  Casari, Marco ^a   Plott, Charles R ^b  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Common dilemmas; Environment; Experiments

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037410365     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00098-7     Document Type: Article

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