Experiments testing multiobject allocation mechanisms

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy

Volumn 6, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 639-675

  Ledyard, John O ^a   Porter, David ^a   Rangel, Antonio ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031500778     PISSN: 10586407     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/105864097567228     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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3. Bykowsky, M.M., R.J. Cull, and J.O. Ledyard, 1995, "Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem," Caltech Social Science Working Paper 916, January.
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6. Kwasnica, A.M., J.O. Ledyard, D. Porter, and J. Scott, 1997, "The Design of Multi-round Multi-object Auctions," Preliminary Paper, delivered to the Public Choice Society, March 21.
7. Ledyard, J.O., C.R. Plott, and D. Porter, 1994a, "A Report to the FCC and to Tradewinds International Inc.: Experimental Tests of Auction Software, Supporting Systems and Organization," Final Report for Subcontract Number 005 (Prime Contract FCC-94-12), September.
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9. _, C. Noussair, and D. Porter, 1996, "The Allocation of a Shared Resource Within an Organization," Economic Design, 2, 163-192.
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14. _, 1997, "Laboratory Experimental Testbeds: Application to the PCS Auction," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, this issue.
15. Porter, D., 1996, "The Effect of Bid Withdrawal in a Multi-Object Auction," Working Paper 982, California Institute of Technology.
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