Bidding in common value auctions: How the commercial construction industry corrects for the winner's curse

Management Science

Volumn 42, Issue 10, 1996, Pages 1463-1475

  Dyer, Douglas ^a   Kagel, John H ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Auctions; Construction Industry; Experiments; Field Data; Winner's Curse

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000537592     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.42.10.1463     Document Type: Article

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