Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 53, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 3-35

  Henrich, Joseph ^a  

^a EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Altruism; Coevolution; Cooperation; Dual inheritance theory; Group selection

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347043608     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(03)00094-5     Document Type: Article

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