Self-command in Adam Smith's theory of moral sentiments: A game-theoretic reinterpretation

Rationality and Society

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 57-80

  Meardon, Stephen J ^a   Ortmann, Andreas ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 21344435417     PISSN: 10434631     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/104346396008001003     Document Type: Article

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