Order of play in strategically equivalent games in extensive form

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 113-136

  Rapoport, Amnon ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031285521     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF01262516     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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