Theory, experiment and the federal communications commision spectrum auctions

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 51, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 303-350

  Banks, Jeffrey ^a   Olson, Mark ^b   Porter, David ^b   Rassenti, Stephen ^b   Smith, Vernon ^b  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Experiments; Information

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038016657     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00149-X     Document Type: Article

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