Concurrent trading in two experimental markets with demand interdependence

Economic Theory

Volumn 16, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 511-528

  Williams, Arlington W ^a   Smith, Vernon L ^b   Ledyard, John O ^c   Gjerstad, Steven ^d  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

^c CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^d IBM T J WATSON RESEARCH CENTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Double auction; General equilibrium; Induced utility

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034340502     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001990050002     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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