Nash equilibrium strategies in directional models of two-candidate spatial competition

Public Choice

Volumn 98, Issue 3-4, 1999, Pages 369-383

  Merrill III, Samuel ^a   Grofman, Bernard ^b   Feld, Scott L ^c  

^a WILKES UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033455489     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1018339426663     Document Type: Article

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