Nash equilibrium in a spatial model of coalition bargaining

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 39, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 133-174

  Schofield, Norman ^a   Parks, Robert ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

C11; C72; C78; Coalition bargaining; D72; Nash equilibrium; Spatial models

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001034282     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00027-X     Document Type: Article

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