The C1 topology on the space of smooth preference profiles

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 16, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 445-470

  Schofield, Norman ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033454862     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550050155     Document Type: Article

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