Models of government formation

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 1, Issue , 1998, Pages 1-25

  Laver, Michael ^a  

^a TRINITY COLLEGE DUBLIN   (Ireland)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Cabinet; Coalitions; Party competition

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032325960     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.1     Document Type: Review

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