Policy divergence in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting

Public Choice

Volumn 100, Issue 1-2, 1999, Pages 103-122

  Adams, James ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033463979     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1018301007077     Document Type: Article

References (32)

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