Multiparty electoral competition in the Netherlands and Germany: A model based on multinomial probit

Public Choice

Volumn 97, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 257-293

  Schofield, Normal ^a   Martin, Andrew D ^a   Quinn, Kevin M ^a   Whitford, Andrew B ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032260628     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1005025522565     Document Type: Article

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