Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 103, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 88-105

  Banks, Jeffrey S ^a   Duggan, John ^b   Le Breton, Michel ^c  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Nash equilibrium; Uncovered set; Undominated strategies

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036205111     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2825     Document Type: Article

References (35)

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