A model of coalition formation: Theory and evidence

Journal of Politics

Volumn 58, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 350-372

  Sened, Itai ^a  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030306375     PISSN: 00223816     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2960230     Document Type: Article

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