Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 103, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 131-161

  Aragones, Enriqueta ^a   Palfrey, Thomas R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036201785     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2821     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. Policy divergence in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting
2. Valence politics and equilibrium in spatial election models
3. Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate
4. Explaining patterns of candidate competition in congressional elections
5. With uncertainty, the Downsian model predicts divergence
6. Candidate reputations and the incumbency effect
7. The existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games I: Theory
8. Equilibrium effects in campaign spending games: Theory and data
9. A Further generalization of the kakutani fixed point theorem with application to Nash equilibrium points
10. Character, charisma, and candidate locations: Downsian models when one candidate has a valence advantage
11. Incumbent reputations and ideological campaign contributions in spatial competition
12. An analysis of congressional career decisions, 1947-86
13. Polarization, incumbency, and the personal vote
14. Comment: What have you done for me lately? Toward an investment theory of voting
15. On a game without a value
16. Spatial Models of Party Competition
17. Candidate Quality, Pressure Group Endorsements, and Uninformed Voters