A bargaining model of collective choice

American Political Science Review

Volumn 94, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 73-88

  Banks, Jeffrey S ^a   Duggan, John ^b  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034336543     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2586381     Document Type: Article

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