Equilibrium in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting

Public Choice

Volumn 98, Issue 1-2, 1999, Pages 59-82

  Lin, Tse Min ^a   Enelow, James M ^a   Dorussen, Han ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

^b NORWEGIAN UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033484685     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1018391410733     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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