Military threats: The costs of coercion and the price of peace

Military Threats: The Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 1-313

  Slantchev, Branislav L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84924631278     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511778940     Document Type: Book

References (340)

1. Achen, Christopher H., and Snidal, Duncan. 1989. Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies. World Politics, 41(2), 143–69.
2. Acheson, Dean. 1987. Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
3. Alt, James, Calvert, Randall, and Humes, Brian. 1988. Reputation and Hegemonic Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis. American Political Science Review, 82(2), 445–66.
4. Altfeld, Michael F. 1983. Arms Races? – And Escalation? A Comment on Wallace. International Studies Quarterly, 27(2), 225–31.
5. Appleman, Roy E. 1961. South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
6. Arrian. 1976. History of Alexander and Indica. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Two volumes.
7. Arrow, Kenneth J. 1970. Social Choice and Individual Values. 2nd edn. New Haven: Yale University Press.
8. Austen-Smith, David, and Banks, Jeffrey S. 2000. Cheap Talk and Burned Money. Journal of Economic Theory, 91(1), 1–16.
9. Bajanov, Evgueni. 1995. Assessing the Politics of the KoreanWar, 1949–51. Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 6–7, 54–91.
10. Ballard, John R. 1998. Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994–1997. Westport: Praeger.
11. Banks, Jeffrey S. 1990. Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games. American Journal of Political Science, 34(3), 599–614.
12. Bates, Darrell. 1984. The Fashoda Incident of 1898: Encounter on the Nile. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
13. Beeching, Jack. 1975. The Chinese Opium Wars. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
14. Beevor, Antony. 1998. Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege, 1942–1943. New York: Penguin.
15. Bennett, D. Scott, and Stam, Allan C. 1996. The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816– 1985. American Political Science Review, 90(2), 239–57.
16. Bernheim, B. Douglas. 1984. Rationalizable Strategic Behavior. Econometrica, 52(4), 1007–28.
17. Betts, Richard K. 1995. Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, and Consequences. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
18. Binmore, Ken. 2007. Does Game Theory Work? The Bargaining Challenge. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
19. Blainey, Geoffrey. 1988. The Causes of War. 3rd edn. New York: The Free Press.
20. Blechman, Barry M. C., and Kaplan, Stephen S. 1978. Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
21. Brandenburger, Adam. 1992. Knowledge and Equilibrium in Games. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6(4), 83–101.
22. Brecher, Michael. 1993. Crises in World Politics: Theory and Reality. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
23. Brewer, John. 1990. The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688– 1783. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
24. Brito, Dagobert L., and Intriligator, Michael D. 1985. Conflict, War, and Redistribution. American Political Science Review, 79(4), 943–57.
25. Brodie, Bernard. 1959. Strategy in the Missile Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
26. Brune, Lester H. 1993. America and the Iraqi Crisis, 1990–1992: Origins and Aftermath. Claremont: Regina Books.
27. Brune, Lester H. (ed.). 1996. The Korean War: Handbook of the Literature and Research. Westport: Greenwood Press.
28. Bucholz, Arden. 2001. Moltke and the German Wars, 1864–1871. Houndmills: Palgrave.
29. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1981. Risk, Power Distributions, and the Likelihood of War. International Studies Quarterly, 25(4), 541–68.
30. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1990. Pride of Place: The Origins of German Hegemony. World Politics, 43(1), 28–52.
31. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Lalman, David. 1986. Reason and War. American Political Science Review, 80(4), 1113–29.
32. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Lalman, David. 1992. War and Reason. New Haven: Yale University Press.
33. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Siverson, Randolph M. 1995. War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability. American Political Science Review, 89(4), 841–55.
34. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Morrow, James D., Siverson, Randolph M., and Smith, Alastair. 1999. An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace. American Political Science Review, 93(4), 791–807.
35. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Morrow, James, Siverson, Randolph, and Smith, Alastair. 2003. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
36. Butow, R.J.C. 1961. Tojo and the Coming of the War. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
37. Calvin, James Barnard. 1984. The China–India Border War (1962). Tech. rept. Marine Corps Command and Staff College.
38. Carr, Edward Hallett. 1939. The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919–1939. London: Macmillan.
39. Chen Jian. 1992. China’s Changing Aims during the Korean War, 1950–1951. Journal of American–East Asian Relations, 1(1), 8–41.
40. Chen Jian. 1994. China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation. New York: Columbia University Press.
41. Chen Jian. 1996. Chinese Policy and the Korean War. In: Brune (1996).
42. Chen Xiaolu. 1989. China’s Policy toward the United States, 1949–1955. In: Harding and Yuan Ming (1989).
43. Chiozza, Giacomo, and Goemans, Hein. 2003. Peace through Insecurity: Tenure and International Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 47(4), 443–67.
44. Chiozza, Giacomo, and Goemans, Hein. 2004a. Avoiding Diversionary Targets. Journal of Peace Research, 41(4), 423–43.
45. Chiozza, Giacomo, and Goemans, Hein. 2004b. International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is War Still Ex Post Inefficient? American Journal of Political Science, 48(3), 604–19.
46. Cho, In-Koo, and Kreps, David M. 1987. Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102(2), 179–221.
47. Christensen, Thomas J. 1992. Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons from Mao’s Korean War Telegrams. International Security, 17(1), 122–54.
48. Cimbala, Stephen J. 1994. Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
49. Clarke, Kevin A., and Primo, David M. 2007. Modernizing Political Science: A Model- Based Approach. Perspectives on Politics, 5(4), 741–53.
50. Claude, Inis. 1962. Power and International Relations. New York: Random House.
51. Costello, John. 1981. The Pacific War. New York: Perennial.
52. Crawford, Vincent P., and Sobel, Joel. 1982. Strategic Information Transmission. Econometrica, 50(6), 1431–51.
53. Danilovic, Vesna. 2001. Conceptual and Selection Bias Issues in Deterrence. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45(1), 97–125.
54. Dorussen, Han, and Mo, Jongryn. 2001. Ending Economic Sanctions: Audience Costs and Rent-Seeking as Commitment Strategies. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45(4), 395–426.
55. Downs, George W., and Rocke, David M. 1994. Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection: The Principal–Agent Problem Goes to War. American Journal of Political Science, 38(2), 362–80.
56. Drezner, Daniel W. 2003. The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion. International Organization, 57(3), 643–59.
57. Dupuy, R. Ernest, and Dupuy, Trevor N. 1985. The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present. 2nd rev. edn. New York: Harper & Row Publishers.
58. Dupuy, Trevor N. 1978. Elusive Victory: The Arab–Israeli Wars, 1947–1974. New York: Harper & Row.
59. Ellsberg, Daniel. 1975. The Theory and Practice of Blackmail. In: Young (1975). Original Santa Monica: Rand Corporation P-3883, 1959.
60. Erickson, John. 1999. The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin’sWar with Germany. New Haven: Yale University Press.
61. Eyerman, Joe, and Hart, Jr., Robert A. 1996. An Empirical Test of the Audience Cost Proposition: Democracy Speaks Louder thanWords. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40(4), 597–616.
62. Farkas, Andrew. 1998. State Learning and International Change. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
63. Farrar, Peter N. 1983. Britain’s Proposal for a Buffer Zone South of the Yalu in November 1950: Was It a Neglected Opportunity to End the Fighting in Korea? Journal of Contemporary History, 18(2), 327–51.
64. Farrell, Joseph, and Gibbons, Robert. 1989. Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining. Journal of Economic Theory, 48(1), 221–37.
65. Fearon, James D. 1992. Threats to Use Force: Costly Signals and Bargaining in International Crises. Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Berkeley.
66. Fearon, James D. 1994a. Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. American Political Science Review, 88(3), 577–92.
67. Fearon, James D. 1994b. Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38(2), 236–69.
68. Fearon, James D. 1995. Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization, 49(3), 379–414.
69. Fearon, James D. 1997. Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(1), 68–90.
70. Fearon, James D. 2002. Selection Effects and Deterrence. International Interactions, 28(1), 5–29.
71. Ferris, Wayne H. 1973. The Power Capabilities of Nation-States: International Conflict and War. Lexington: Lexington Books.
72. Foot, Rosemary. 1991. Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade. Diplomatic History, 15(2), 411–32.
73. Frankel, Max. 2005. High Noon in the Cold War: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Presidio Press.
74. Freedman, Lawrence (ed.). 1998. Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
75. Freedman, Lawrence. 2003. Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. 3rd edn. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
76. Freedman, Lawrence, and Karsh, Efraim. 1993. The Gulf Conflict, 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
77. Frey, Bruno S., and Kucher, Marcel. 2000. History as Reflected in Capital Markets: The Case of World War II. Journal of Economic History, 60(2), 468–96.
78. Fudenberg, Drew, and Levine, David K. 1992. Maintaining Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed. Review of Economics and Statistics, 59(3), 561–79.
79. Fudenberg, Drew, and Tirole, Jean. 1991a. Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
80. Fudenberg, Drew, and Tirole, Jean. 1991b. Perfect Bayesian and Sequential Equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory, 53(2), 236–60.
81. Gaddis, John Lewis. 1989. The American “Wedge” Strategy, 1949–1955. In: Harding and Yuan Ming (1989).
82. Gaddis, John Lewis. 1998. We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
83. Garfinkel, Michelle, and Skaperdas, Stergios. 2000. Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: How the Future Matters. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6), 793–807.
84. Garnham, David. 1976. Dyadic InternationalWar 1816–1965: The Role of Power Parity and Geographical Proximity. Western Political Quarterly, 29(2), 231–42.
85. Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor. 1996. Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations. International Organization, 50(1), 109–39.
86. Geller, Daniel S. 1993. Power Differentials and War in Rival Dyads. International Studies Quarterly, 37(2), 173–93.
87. Gelpi, Christopher, and Griesdorf, Michael. 2001. Winners or Losers: Democracies in International Crises. American Political Science Review, 95(3), 633–48.
88. George, Alexander L. 1994. Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics. In: George and Simons (1994).
89. George, Alexander L., and Simons, William E. (eds.). 1994. The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy. 2nd edn. Boulder: Westview Press.
90. George, Alexander L., and Smoke, Richard. 1974. Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. New York: Columbia University Press.
91. Gies, Joseph, and Gies, Frances. 1969. Life in a Medieval City. New York: Harper Perennial.
92. Gilpin, Robert. 1981. War and Change in World Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
93. Glaser, Charles L. 2004. When Are Arms Races Dangerous? Rational versus Suboptimal Arming. International Security, 28(4), 44–84.
94. Gochman, Charles S. 1990. Capability-Driven Disputes. In: Gochman and Sabrosky (1990).
95. Gochman, Charles S., and Sabrosky, Alan Ned (eds.). 1990. Prisoners of War? Nation- States in the Modern Era. Lexington: Lexington Books.
96. Goemans, Hein E. 2000. Fighting for Survival: The Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(5), 555–79.
97. Goldhamer, Herbert. 1979. Reality and Belief in Military Affairs. Santa Monica: Rand. Rand Report R-2448-NA, February.
98. Goldsworthy, Adrian. 2002. The Punic Wars. London: Cassell.
99. Goncharov, Sergei N., Lewis, JohnW., and Xue Litai. 1993. Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
100. Gowa, Joanne. 2001. Who Yields? Democracies in International Crises. Presented at the International Relations Speaker Series, Yale University, April 25, 2001.
101. Graff, David A. 2002. Medieval Chinese Warfare, 300–900. London: Routledge.
102. Green, Peter. 1996. The Greco-Persian Wars. Berkeley: University of California Press. Revised edn.
103. Gribkov, Anatoli I., and Smith, William Y. 1993. Operation Anadyr: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis. Chicago: Edition Q.
104. Guisinger, Alexandra, and Smith, Alastair. 2002. Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46(2), 175–200.
105. Gurtov, Melvin, and Hwang, Byong-Moo. 1980. China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
106. Hall, Richard C. 2000. The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War. London: Routledge.
107. Hao Yufan, and Zhai Zhihai. 1990. China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited. The China Quarterly, Mar., 94–115.
108. Harcave, Sidney (ed.). 1990. The Memoirs of Count Witte. New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc.
109. Harding, Harry, and Yuan Ming (eds.). 1989. Sino-American Relations, 1945–1955: A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources.
110. Harsanyi, John C. 1968. Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players. Management Science, 14(3, 5, 7), 159–82, 320–34, 486–502.
111. Harvey, Frank P. 1995. Rational Deterrence Theory Revisited: A Progress Report. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 28(3), 403–36.
112. Harvey, Frank P. 1998. Rigor Mortis or Rigor, More Tests: Necessity, Sufficiency, and Deterrence Logic. International Studies Quarterly, 42(4), 675–707.
113. Heller, Francis H. (ed.). 1997. The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective. Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas.
114. Herek, Gregory M., Janis, Irving, and Huth, Paul. 1987. Decision-Making during International Crises: Is Quality of Process Related to Outcome? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 31(2), 203–26.
115. Hermann, Charles F. (ed.). 1972. International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research. New York: The Free Press.
116. Hershberg, James G. 2004. Russian Documents on the Korean War, 1950–53. Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 14–15, 369–98.
117. Hibbert, Christopher. 1974. The House of Medici: Its Rise and Fall. New York: Harper Perennial.
118. Hickey, Donald R. 1989. The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
119. Hinton, Harold C. 1966. Communist China in World Politics. London: Macmillan.
120. Hirshleifer, Jack. 1988. The Analytics of Continuing Conflict. Synthese, 76(2), 201–33.
121. Hirshleifer, Jack. 1991. The Technology of Conflict as an Economic Activity. American Economic Review, 81(2), 130–34.
122. Hirshleifer, Jack. 2000. The Macrotechnology of Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6), 773–92.
123. Hoffmann, Steven A. 1990. India and the China Crisis. Berkeley: The University of California Press.
124. Homer. 1990. The Iliad. New York: Penguin. Tr. Robert Fagles.
125. Hopf, Ted. 1991. Polarity, The Offense–Defense Balance, and War. American Political Science Review, 85(2), 475–93.
126. Hopf, Ted. 1994. Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965–1990. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
127. Hopple, Gerald W. 1984. Intelligence and Warning: Implications and Lessons of the Falkland Islands War. World Politics, 36(3), 339–61.
128. Houweling, Henk W., and Siccama, Jan G. 1988. Power Transitions as a Cause of War. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 32(1), 87–102.
129. Howard, Michael. 1981. The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870–1871. London: Routledge.
130. Huth, Paul, and Russett, Bruce. 1984. What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900–1980. World Politics, 36(4), 496–526.
131. Huth, Paul, and Russett, Bruce. 1988. Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation. International Studies Quarterly, 32(1), 29–45.
132. Huth, Paul, and Russett, Bruce. 1990. Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigour Makes a Difference. World Politics, 42(4), 466–501.
133. Huth, Paul, Gelpi, Christopher, and Bennett, D. Scott. 1993. The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes: Testing Rational Deterrence Theory and Structural Realism. American Political Science Review, 87(3), 609–23.
134. Huth, Paul K. 1988. Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War. New Haven: Yale University Press.
135. Huth, Paul K., and Russett, Bruce. 1993. General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models. American Political Science Review, 87(1), 61–73.
136. Ike, Nobutaka. 1967. Japan’s Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
137. Iklé, Fred Charles. 1964. How Nations Negotiate. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers.
138. India Ministry of External Affairs. 1963. Notes, Memoranda, and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed Between the Governments of India and China: White Paper. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs.
139. Insight Team of the London Sunday Times, The. 1974. The Yom Kippur War. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
140. Jakobson, Max. 1961. The Diplomacy of the Winter War: An Account of the Russo- Finnish War, 1939–1940. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
141. Jervis, Robert. 1970. The Logic of Images in International Relations. New York: Columbia University Press.
142. Jervis, Robert. 1979. Deterrence Theory Revisited. World Politics, 31(2), 289–324.
143. Jervis, Robert, Lebow, Richard Ned, and Stein, Janice Gross. 1985. Psychology and Deterrence. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
144. Kagan, Donald. 1990. The Archidamian War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
145. Kagan, Donald. 2003. The Peloponnesian War. New York: Penguin Books.
146. Kahn, Herman. 1960. On Thermonuclear War. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
147. Kahn, Herman. 1965. On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios. New York: Praeger.
148. Kam, Ephraim. 2004. Surprise Attack: The Victim’s Perspective. Cambrdige, MA: Harvard University Press.
149. Karsten, Peter, Howell, Peter D., and Allen, Artis Frances. 1984. Military Threats: A Systematic Historical Analysis of the Determinants of Success. Westport: Greenwood Press.
150. Kaufman, Burton I. 1997. The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command. 2nd edn. New York: McGraw-Hill.
151. Kennedy, Paul M.?1987. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
152. Kilgour, D. Marc, and Zagare, Frank C. 1991. Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence. American Journal of Political Science, 35(2), 305–34.
153. Kim, Woosang. 1989. Power, Alliance, and Major Wars, 1816–1975. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 33(2), 255–73.
154. Kim, Woosang, and Morrow, James. 1992. When Do Power Shifts Lead toWar? American Journal of Political Science, 36(4), 896–922.
155. Kissinger, Henry A. 1979. The White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown.
156. Kreps, David, and Wilson, Robert. 1982. Reputation and Imperfect Information. Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2), 253–79.
157. Kreps, David, Milgrom, Paul R., Roberts, D. John, and Wilson, Robert. 1982. Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2), 245–52.
158. Kugler, Jacek, and Lemke, Douglas (eds.). 1996. Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
159. Kydd, Andrew H. 2000. Arms Races and Arms Control: Modeling the Hawk Perspective. American Journal of Political Science, 44(2), 222–38.
160. Kydd, Andrew H. 2005. Trust and Mistrust in International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
161. Lai, Brian. 2004. The Effects of Different Types of Military Mobilization on the Outcome of International Crises. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48(2), 211–29.
162. Lake, David. 1992. Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War. American Political Science Review, 86(1), 24–38.
163. Lalman, David. 1988. Conflict Resolution and Peace. American Journal of Political Science, 32(3), 590–615.
164. Lamb, Alastair. 1964. The China–India Border. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
165. Langer, William L. 1935. The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890–1902. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Two volumes.
166. Langlois, Catherine C., and Langlois, Jean-Pierre P. 2005. Fully Informed and On the Road to Ruin: The Perfect Failure of Asymmetric Deterrence. International Studies Quarterly, 49(3), 503–27.
167. Lauren, Paul Gordon. 1994. Coercive Diplomacy and Ultimata: Theory and Practice in History. In: George and Simons (1994).
168. Lebow, Richard Ned. 1981. Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
169. Lebow, Richard Ned. 1987. Deterrence Failure Revisited. International Security, 12(1), 197–213.
170. Lebow, Richard Ned, and Stein, Janice Gross. 1987. Beyond Deterrence. Journal of Social Issues, 43(4), 5–71.
171. Lebow, Richard Ned, and Stein, Janice Gross. 1989. Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter. World Politics, 41(2), 208–24.
172. Lebow, Richard Ned, and Stein, Janice Gross. 1990. Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable. World Politics, 42(3), 336–69.
173. Leeds, Brett Ashley. 1999. Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation. American Journal of Political Science, 43(4), 979–1002.
174. Lemke, Douglas, and Werner, Suzanne. 1996. Power Parity, Commitment to Change, and War. International Studies Quarterly, 40(2), 235–60.
175. Leng, Russell J. 1993. Interstate Crisis Behavior, 1816–1980: Realism versus Reciprocity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
176. Leventoğlu, Bahar, and Slantchev, Branislav L. 2007. The Armed Peace: A Punctuated- Equilibrium Theory of War. American Journal of Political Science, 51(4), 755–71.
177. Levy, Jack S. 1987. Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War. World Politics, 40(1), 82–107.
178. Levy, Jack S. 1988. When Do Deterrent Threats Work? British Journal of Political Science, 18(4), 485–512.
179. Levy, Jack S. 1989a. The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence. In: Tetlock et al. (1989).
180. Levy, Jack S. 1989b. The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique. In: Midlarsky (1989).
181. Levy, Jack S. 1994. Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield. International Organization, 48(2), 279–312.
182. Li Xiaobing, Millett, Allan R., and Yu Bin (eds.). 2001. Mao’s Generals Remember Korea. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
183. Liddell Hart, B. H. 1991. Strategy. New York: Meridian.
184. Lipson, Charles. 2003. Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
185. Lohmann, Susanne. 2003. Why Do Institutions Matter? An Audience-Cost Theory of Institutional Commitment. Governance, 16(1), 95–110.
186. Lynn, John A. 1999. The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667–1714. London: Longman.
187. Mahon, Lord. 2005. The Life of Belisarius. Yardley, PA: Westholme Publishing.
188. Mailath, George J., and Samuelson, Larry. 1998. Your Reputation Is Who You’re Not, Not Who You’d Like To Be. Manuscript, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
189. Mailath, George J., and Samuelson, Larry. 2006. Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
190. Manchester, William. 1978. American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur, 1880–1964. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company.
191. Mansfield, Edward, Milner, Helen, and Rosendorff, B. Peter. 2002. Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. International Organization, 56(3), 477–513.
192. Mansourov, Alexandre Y. 1995. Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War, September 16–October 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives. Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 6–7, 94–119.
193. Maoz, Zeev. 1983. Resolve, Capabilities, and the Outcome of Interstate Disputes, 1816–1976. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27(2), 195–229.
194. Maoz, Zeev. 1990. Paradoxes of War: On the Art of National Self-Entrapment. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
195. Maoz, Zeev, and Russett, Bruce. 1993. Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace. American Political Science Review, 87(3), 624–38.
196. Mark, Eduard. 1997. TheWar Scare of 1946 and Its Consequences. Diplomatic History, 21(3), 383–415.
197. Maxwell, Neville. 1970. India’s China War. New York: Pantheon Books.
198. McCarty, Nolan, and Meirowitz, Adam. 2007. Political Game Theory: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
199. McClelland, Charles A. 1961. The Acute International Crisis. World Politics, 14(1), 182–204.
200. McGinnis, Michael D. 1992. Bridging or Broadening the Gap? A Comment on Wagner’s ‘Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence Theory’. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 4(4), 443–57.
201. Mearsheimer, John J. 1990. Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War. International Security, 15(1), 5–56.
202. Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton.
203. Meisner, Maurice. 1999. Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic. New York: The Free Press.
204. Mercer, Jonathan. 1996. Reputation and International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
205. Midlarsky, Manus I. (ed.). 1989. Handbook of War Studies. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
206. Milgrom, Paul R., and Roberts, John D. 1982. Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence. Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2), 280–312.
207. Morgan, Patrick M. 1977. Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
208. Morgan, Patrick M. 2003. Deterrence Now. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
209. Morgenthau, Hans J. 1948. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
210. Morris, Ivan. 1975. The Nobility of Failure: Tragic Heroes in the History of Japan. New York: The Noonday Press.
211. Morrow, James D. 1989a. Bargaining in Repeated Crisis: A Limited Information Model. In: Ordeshook (1989).
212. Morrow, James D. 1989b. Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining. American Journal of Political Science, 33(4), 941–72.
213. Morrow, James D. 1989c. A Twist of Truth: A Reexamination of the Effects of Arms Races on the Occurrence of War. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 33(3), 500–29.
214. Morrow, James D. 1994a. Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38(2), 270–97.
215. Morrow, James D. 1994b. Game Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
216. Moul, William Brian. 1988. Balances of Power and the Escalation to War of Serious Disputes among the European Great Powers, 1815–1939: Some Evidence. American Journal of Political Science, 32(2), 241–75.
217. Mueller, John. 1995. The Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics. New York: Harper Collins.
218. Mullik, B. N. 1971. My Years with Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal. Bombay: Allied Publishers.
219. Myerson, Roger B. 1979. Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem. Econometrica, 47(1), 61–74.
220. Myerson, Roger B., and Satterthwaite, Mark A. 1983. Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading. Journal of Economic Theory, 28, 265–81.
221. Nalebuff, Barry. 1991. Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World. World Politics, 43(3), 313–35.
222. Naroll, Raoul, Bullough, Vern L., and Naroll, Frada. 1974. Military Deterrence in History: A Pilot Cross-Historical Survey. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
223. Nash, John. 1951. Non-cooperative Games. Annals of Mathematics, 54, 286–95.
224. Norwich, John Julius. 2003. A History of Venice. London: Penguin Books.
225. Offner, Arnold A. 2002. Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945–1953. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
226. O’Neill, Barry. 1991. Conflictual Moves in Bargaining:Warnings, Threats, Escalations, and Ultimatums. In: Young (1991).
227. O’Neill, Barry. 1992. Are Game Models of Deterrence Biased Towards Arms- Building?Wagner on Rationality and Misperception. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 4(4), 459–77.
228. O’Neill, Barry. 1999. Honor, Symbols, and War. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
229. Ordeshook, Peter C. (ed.). 1989. Models of Strategic Choice in Politics. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
230. Oren, Michael B. 2002. Six Days of War. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
231. Organski, A. F. K. 1968. World Politics. 2nd edn. New York: Knopf.
232. Organski, A. F. K., and Kugler, Jacek. 1980. The War Ledger. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
233. Orme, John David. 1987. Deterrence Failures: A Second Look. International Security, 11(4), 96–124.
234. Orme, John David. 2004. Paradox of Peace: Leaders, Decisions, and Conflict Resolution. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
235. Overy, Richard. 1995. Why the Allies Won. New York: W.W. Norton.
236. Palmer, Glenn, and Partell, Peter J. 1999. Audience Costs and Interstate Crises: An Empirical Assessment of Fearon’s Model of Dispute Outcomes. International Studies Quarterly, 43(2), 389–405.
237. Parker, Geoffrey. 1996. The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
238. Paul, T. V. 1994. Asymmetric Conflict: War Initiation by Weaker Powers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
239. Pearce, David G. 1984. Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection. Econometrica, 52(4), 1029–50.
240. Petersen, Walter J. 1986. Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical Assessment of Conventional Wisdom. International Studies Quarterly, 30(3), 269–94.
241. Pollack, Jonathan D. 1989. The KoreanWar and Sino-American Relations. In: Harding and Yuan Ming (1989).
242. Powell, Robert. 1990. Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
243. Powell, Robert. 1993. Guns, Butter, and Anarchy. American Political Science Review, 87(1), 115–32.
244. Powell, Robert. 1996a. Bargaining in the Shadow of Power. Games and Economic Behavior, 15(2), 255–89.
245. Powell, Robert. 1996b. Stability and the Distribution of Power. World Politics, 48(2), 239–67.
246. Powell, Robert. 1999. In the Shadow of Power. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
247. Powell, Robert. 2004. The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information. American Political Science Review, 98(2), 231–41.
248. Powell, Robert. 2006. War as a Commitment Problem. International Organization, 60(1), 169–203.
249. Prescott, William H. 2001. History of the Conquest of Mexico. New York: The Modern Library.
250. Press, Daryl G. 2005. Calculating Credibility. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
251. Reed, William. 2000. A Unified Statistical Model of Conflict Onset and Escalation. American Journal of Political Science, 44(1), 84–93.
252. Richards, Diana, Morgan, T. Clifton, Wilson, Rick K., Schwebach, Valerie L., and Young, Gary D. 1993. Good Times, Bad Times, and the Diversionary Use of Force: A Tale of Some Not-So-Free Agents. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 37(3), 504–35.
253. Richardson, Lewis F. 1960. Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of War. Pittsburgh, PA: Homewood.
254. Robertson, E. M. 1967. Hitler’s Pre-War Policy and Military Plans, 1933–1939. New York: The Citadel Press.
255. Roe, Patrick C. 2000. The Dragon Strikes: China and the Korean War, June–December 1950. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
256. Roy, Arundhati (ed.). 2006. 13 December: The Strange Case of the Attack on the Indian Parliament. New Delhi: Penguin Books India.
257. Russett, Bruce. 1993. Grasping the Democratic Peace. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
258. Russett, Bruce M. (ed.). 1972. Peace, War, and Numbers. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
259. Sagan, Scott D. 1994. From Deterrence to Coercion to War: The Road to Pearl Harbor. In: George and Simons (1994).
260. Sagan, Scott D. 2000. The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks. International Security, 24(4), 85–115.
261. Sample, Susan G. 1998. Military Buildups, War, and Realpolitik: A Multivariate Model. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42(2), 156–75.
262. Sample, Susan G. 2002. The Outcomes of Military Buildups: Minor State vs. Major Powers. Journal of Peace Research, 39(6), 669–91.
263. Sartori, Anne E. 2002. The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes. International Organization, 56(1), 121–49.
264. Sartori, Anne E. 2005. Deterrence by Diplomacy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
265. Schaller, Michael. 2002. The United States and China: Into the Twenty-First Century. New York: Oxford University Press.
266. Schelling, Thomas C. 1956. Essay on Bargaining. American Economic Review, 46(3), 281–306.
267. Schelling, Thomas C. 1958. The Strategy of Conflict: Prospectus for a Reorientation of Game Theory. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2(3), 203–64.
268. Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
269. Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press.
270. Schelling, Thomas C. 1982. Establishing Credibility: Strategic Considerations. American Economic Review, 72(2), 77–80.
271. Schultz, Kenneth A. 1999. Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War. International Organization, 53(2), 233–66.
272. Schultz, Kenneth A. 2001. Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
273. Schultz, Kenneth A., and Weingast, Barry R. 2003. The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition. International Organization, 57(1), 1–40.
274. Selten, Reinhard. 1975. Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. International Journal of Game Theory, 4(1), 25–55.
275. Selten, Reinhard. 1978. The Chain-Store Paradox. Theory and Decision, 9(2), 127–59.
276. Shen Zhihua. 1996. The Discrepancy between the Russian and Chinese Versions of Mao’s October 2 1950 Message to Stalin on Chinese Entry into the Korean War.Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 8–9, 237–42.
277. Sheng, Michael M. 1995. Beijing’s Decision to Enter the Korean War: A Reappraisal and New Documentation. Korea and World Affairs, 19(2), 294–313.
278. Signorino, Curtis S. 1999. Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict. American Political Science Review, 93(2), 279–98.
279. Signorino, Curtis S. 2002. Strategy and Selection in International Relations. International Interactions, 28(1), 93–115.
280. Signorino, Curtis S., and Tarar, Ahmer. 2006. A Unified Theory and Test of Extended Immediate Deterrence. American Journal of Political Science, 50(3), 586–605.
281. Singer, J. David. 1984. Deterrence, Arms Control, and Disarmament. 2nd edn. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
282. Singer, J. David, Bremer, Stuart, and Stuckey, John. 1972. Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820–1965. In: Russett (1972).
283. Siverson, Randolph M., and Sullivan, Michael P. 1983. The Distribution of Power and the Onset of War. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27(3), 473–94.
284. Siverson, Randolph M., and Tennefoss, Michael R. 1984. Power, Alliance, and the Escalation of International Conflict, 1815–1965. American Political Science Review, 78(4), 1057–69.
285. Slantchev, Branislav L. 2003a. The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States. American Political Science Review, 47(1), 123–33.
286. Slantchev, Branislav L. 2003b. The Principle of Convergence inWartime Negotiations. American Political Science Review, 47(4), 621–32.
287. Slantchev, Branislav L. 2004a. How Initiators End TheirWars: The Duration ofWarfare and the Terms of Peace. American Journal of Political Science, 48(4), 813–29.
288. Slantchev, Branislav L. 2004b. Mobilization, Offense Dominance, and PreemptiveWar. Manuscript, University of California, San Diego.
289. Slantchev, Branislav L. 2005. Military Coercion in Interstate Crises. American Political Science Review, 99(4), 533–47.
290. Slantchev, Branislav L. 2006. Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs. International Studies Quarterly, 50(2), 445–77.
291. Slantchev, Branislav L. 2010. Feigning Weakness. International Organization, 64(3), 357–88.
292. Smith, Alastair. 1996. Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems. International Studies Quarterly, 40(1), 133–53.
293. Smith, Alastair. 1998a. Fighting Battles, WinningWars. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42(3), 301–20.
294. Smith, Alastair. 1998b. International Crises and Domestic Politics. American Political Science Review, 92(3), 623–38.
295. Smith, Alastair. 1999. Testing Theories of Strategic Choice: The Example of Crisis Escalation. American Journal of Political Science, 43(4), 1254–83.
296. Snyder, Glenn H. 1961. Deterrence and Defense. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
297. Snyder, Glenn H., and Diesing, Paul. 1977. Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
298. Spence, Michael. 1973. Job Market Signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), 355–74.
299. Strassler, Robert B. (ed.). 1996. The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War. New York: Free Press.
300. Strauss, Barry. 2004. The Battle of Salamis: The Naval Encounter that Saved Greece – and Western Civilization. New York: Simon and Schuster.
301. Stueck, William. 1998. The Korean War as History: David Rees’ Korea: The Limited War in Retrospect. Paper presented at the National Archives and Records Administration Conference on Cold War documentation, September 25–26, 1998, at the University of Maryland, College Park.
302. Stueck, William. 2002. Rethinking the Korean War. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
303. Tallett, Frank. 1992. War and Society in Early Modern Europe, 1495–1715. London: Routledge.
304. Tarar, Ahmer. 2005. Diversionary Incentives and the Bargaining Approach to War.International Studies Quarterly, 50(1), 169–88.
305. Taubman, William. 2003. Khrushchev: The Man and His Era. New York:W.W. Norton & Company.
306. Taylor, A. J. P. 1961. The Origins of the Second World War. New York: Touchstone.
307. Taylor, A.J.P. 1971. The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
308. Tetlock, Philip E., Husbands, Jo L., Jervis, Robert, Stern, Paul C., and Tilly, Charles (eds.). 1989. Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War. Vol. 1. New York: Oxford University Press.
309. Thomas, Hugh. 2005. Conquest: Montezuma, Cortés, and the Fall of Old Mexico. New York: Simon and Schuster.
310. Thucydides. 1996. The Peloponnesian War. In: Strassler (1996).
311. Trachtenberg, Mark. 1991. History and Strategy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
312. Trotter, William R. 1991. A Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939–1940. Chapel Hill: Algonquin Books.
313. United States Department of State. 1976. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950. Volume VII: Korea. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
314. United States Department of State. 1996. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961– 1963. Volume VI: Kennedy–Khrushchev Exchanges. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
315. Van Creveld, Martin. 1977. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
316. Van Evera, Stephen. 1999. Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
317. Von Neumann, John, and Morgenstern, Oskar. 1947. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
318. Wagner, R. Harrison. 1982. Deterrence and Bargaining. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 26(2), 329–58.
319. Wagner, R. Harrison. 1992. Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence Theory. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 4(2), 115–41.
320. Wagner, R. Harrison. 1994. Peace, War, and the Balance of Power. American Political Science Review, 88(3), 593–607.
321. Wallace, Michael D. 1982. Armaments and Escalation: Two Competing Hypotheses. International Studies Quarterly, 26(1), 37–56.
322. Walter, Barbara F. 2002. Committing to Peace. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
323. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.
324. Wang Jisi. 1989. The Origins of America’s “Two China” Policy. In: Harding and Yuan Ming (1989).
325. Weart, Spencer R. 1988. Never At War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another. New Haven: Yale University Press.
326. Weeks, Jessica. 2008. Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve. International Organization, 62(1), 35–64.
327. Weidenmier, Marc D. 2002. Turning Points in the US Civil War: Views from the Grayback Market. Southern Economic Journal, 68(4), 875–90.
328. Weinberg, Gerhard L. 1970. The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany: Diplomatic Revolution in Europe, 1933–36. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
329. Werner, Suzanne, and Kugler, Jacek. 1996. Power Transitions and Military Buildups: Resolving the Relationship between Arms Buildups andWar. In: Kugler and Lemke (1996).
330. Whiting, Allen S. 1960. China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War. New York: The Macmillan Company.
331. Whiting, Allen S. 1975. The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
332. Wittman, Donald. 1979. How a War Ends: A Rational Model Approach. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 23(4), 743–63.
333. Wohlstetter, Roberta. 1962. Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
334. Wright, Quincy. 1965. A Study ofWar. Second edn. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
335. Xenophon. 1950. The Persian Expedition. Revised edn. London: Penguin Classics. Tr. Rex Warner.
336. Young, H. Peyton (ed.). 1991. Negotiation Analysis. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
337. Young, Oran R. 1968. The Politics of Force: Bargaining During International Crises. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
338. Young, Oran R. (ed.). 1975. Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
339. Zagare, Frank C., and Kilgour, D. Marc. 2000. Perfect Deterrence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
340. Zhang Shu Guang. 1995. Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–1953. Lawrence: Regents of Kansas Press.