State learning and international change

State Learning and International Change

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-199

  Farkas, Andrew ^a  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 85058908904     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

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