Conceptual and selection bias issues in deterrence

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 45, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 97-125

  Danilovic, Vesna ^a  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035242043     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002701045001005     Document Type: Article

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