Signaling foreign policy interests: Tying hands versus sinking costs

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 41, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 68-90

  Fearon, James D ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031060815     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002797041001004     Document Type: Article

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